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DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
INDMDUAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
• ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of dispute resolution systems for international 
organizations is of growing importance. Not only has there been 
a plethora of new international and regional organizations created 
in the last few years, but this trend is likely to continue. There 
are numerous proposals for multilateral free trade areas and 
agreements across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in 
Asia.1 · At the same time, existing international trade organiza-
tions have come under increasing scrutiny for their inability to 
reflect accurately the needs and concerns of the citizens of the 
member states. · 
For example, the debate about fast track authority for the 
Clinton Administration reflects concerns about the benefits of 
free trade agreements to the U.S. economy and fears that in-
creased free trade with less developed states will lead to an elimi-
nation of jobs in certain manufacturing .sectors.2 This debate fo-
' Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D., 
Harvard Law School; A.B., Princeton University. I would like to thank Jeffery 
Atik, Steve Charnovitz and Frank Garcia for their insightful comments and 
questions. John McDonald and Sara Cobb also provided helpful feedback. An 
early draft of this Article was presented at the conference Linkage as Phenome-
non: An Interdisciplinary Approach, sponsored by the International Economic 
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. I appreciate 
the valuable comments from the conference participants. Many thanKS also go 
to Maria Cheryan and Emily Canedo for their superior research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements~-An Interim Stage in 
Buildin~e Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 
{1997) Cliscussing implementation of the Free Trade Area); Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., 
Hemtsp ·c Integratwn and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA· 
Based System, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 127 {1995) {discussing importance of 
NAFT A to the establishment of tlie free trade zone in the Western Hemi-
sphere); Merit Janow, Assessing APEC's Role in Economic Integration in the Asia-
Pacifc Regwn, 17 Nw. J.INT'L~. & Bus. 947 (1997). · . 
Fast track allows the President to negotiate trade pacts and submit them 
to Congress for up-or-down votes, with no amendments allowed See Peter 
Baker & Paul Bluestein, Clinton Searches for MicJ4le on 'Fast Track', .WASH. 
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cuses on whether it is even in our citizens' interests for the United 
States to join international trade organizations. Meanwhile, 
across the Atlantic Ocean, the ongoing debate about the 
"democracy deficit" in the European Union ("EU") demonstrates 
the concern with the decreased ability of citizens to have a say in 
what the laws are under the EU.3 This debate focuses on the abil-
ity of citizens to influence lawmakers in the substantive laws that 
directly affect their lives. In both of these debates, people have 
examined the legitimacy of international trade organizations and 
debated ways of structurinf these organizations to be more demo-
cratic and more legitimate. 
POST, Sept. 11, 1997, at AS. Fast track supporters argt~e that without fast track, 
it would be impossible for the United States to conclude deals with other na-
tions because the agreements are subject to Congressional approval. Many na-
tions are hesitant to negotiate agreements when they know that Congress can 
reopen them in the approval process and force further negotiations. See, e.g., 
Bob Dole & Lloyd Bentsen, Editorial, 'Fast Track' Issue Deserves Fast Action, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A31. Supporters of fast track generally favor in-
creased free trade. Those opposed to fast track are those more doubtful of the 
benefits offree trade and harmonization of standards, including labor and envi-
ronmental groups. See Linda Clerkin, Shut Up and Take Your Medicine: Will 
International Laws Force Vitamins 0/JU.S. Shelves? CITY EDmON: THE WKLY 
NEWSPAPER OF MILWAUKEE, Nov. 20, 1997 ("We believe that each nation's 
needs are unique, and it shouldn't be up to an international group to decide 
what laws best govern that nation. It should be up to those nations them-
selves.") (quoting Susan Haeger, Executive Director of Citizens for Health pro-
testing harmonized guidelines for vitamins and minerals under CODEX). For 
a discussion that links current trends in international trade and the economy 
towards strengthening the argument .for fast track, see the vie~oint by the 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for international economic pohcy from 1989 
to 1993, in Thomas J. Duesterberg, Selling the Free-Trade Story, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 1997, at BU9. For a view of whether fast track is necessary to accom-
plish trade pacts, see David Sanger, The Trade Bill: The Impact, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 1997, at A6, and also see Lori Wallach,Fast Track Trade Authority: 
Wbo Needs Fast Track?, J. COM., Sept. 19, 1997, at 9A. Although fast track 
authority was not granted last year, 1t is clear that the debate over free trade in 
general and fast track in particular will recur. 
' See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.. 
2403, 2466-74 (1991). Weiler's article describes "democracy aeficit" as the abil-
ity of the unelected branches of the EU, the Council and the Commission to 
pass legislation overriding laws passed by the national parliaments. In other 
words, it is possible for Citizens of a certain member state to be required to fol-
low a law for which neither they nor their duly elected representatives voted. 
Democracy deficit also refers to the comparative lack of political power in the 
only elected EU body, the Parliament.. See generally Anne-Marie Burley, De-
mocracy and Judicial Review in the European Communiry, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 81 (1992) (examining the roles of legis1ative and judic1al bodies in the EU). 
4 For example, the Environmental Side Agreement of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA ") was designed to assuage concerns about in-
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This article takes a different approach to understanding ques-
tions of legitimacy and democracy in international organizations5 
by examining the dispute resolution mechanisms used in these or-
ganizations. An alternative method of assessing legitimacy and 
democracy in international organizations would be to look at the 
ability of private actors to enforce rules once they are enacted. 
Ultimately, I shall argue that increasing individual involvement in 
dispute resolution-by granting private actors rights and standing 
under these organizations-is an appropriate way to increase the 
legitimacy of international trade organizations. 
Section 2 of this Article reviews the general arguments sur-
rounding democracy in international organizations. I will exam-
ine the increased role of private actors in international law as ad-
vocated by liberal international relations theory, the arguments 
surrounding the democracy deficit in the EU,6 and the issue of 
capture by narrow political interests reflected in the debate over 
fast track authority. · 
In order to understand different levels of individual involve-
ment in dispute resolution, Section 3 of this Article examines 
some factors in determining different types of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. These factors-direct effect, standing, supremacy, 
transparency and enforcement-all reflect different levels of in-
volvement between the trade organization and the citizens under 
it. 
The Section 4 of this Article makes the argument that in-
creased individual involvement will increase democracy in these 
trade organizations. This involvement will increase the role of 
private actors in lawmaking, make enforcement of the original 
trade agreement more likely, reduce the danger of capture by nar-
adequate enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico and the resulting con· 
cern about a "race-to-the-bottom" -the fear that companies would relocate 
there in order to take advantage of the lax enforcement. See North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). 
5 In an attem('t to give some defmition to ambiguous and critical terms, I 
use the term "legitimacy" to refer to the lawfulness and appropriateness of these 
international organizations, as well as the perceived fairness and justice resulting 
from these agreements. "Democracy" refers to the representative and participa-
tory aspects of international organizations. 
6 See Treary Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for 
signature Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) 
[liereinafter the EEC TREATY]. 
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row interests, increase the transparency of these trade organiza-
tions and, in the end, make organizations themselves more effec-
tive. Finally, Section 5 concludes the Article. 
2. DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
There are three critiques of international organizations that 
can shed light on the involvement of private actors. 
2.1. Liberal International Relatiom Theory 
The first argument comes from the liberal international rela-
tions theory ("liberal IR. ") of political science, which has now 
been more regularly applied to international law? Liberal IR. ar-
gues that previous international relations theories, such as realism 8 
and regime theory/ are too state-based in their assessment of in-
ternational relations. Liberal IR. focuses on the actors behind the 
veil of the state, looking at how the state is organized and who 
has power, in order to understand the motivations and interac-
tions of states in the international realm. In examining dispute 
resolution, several proponents of liberal IR. have looked at the 
European system a11d the role of private actors for explaining its 
success.
1
° Furthermore, scholars have focused on how intern:a-
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Re-
lations Theory: A Dual Ageiula, 87 AM. J. INr'LL. 205 (1993) (proJ>osin!\ applica-
tion of "liberal" international relations theory to internat10niil law); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, 7be Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory 
and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
377 (1994) (discussing liberal conception of the United Nations); David P. 
Fidler, LiBER TAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act From 
Within Liberal International Relations 7beory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
297 (1997) (using liberal IR to examine U.S. legislation). 
8 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Pro-
spectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INr'L L. 335, 336-38 (1989); see also 
Burley, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing realism theory). For more on apply-
ing realism to international trade see generally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER 
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE POLfTICAL ECONOMY OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT lNvEslMENT (1975), and HANs J. MORGENTHAU, Pormcs 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE {5th ed. 1973). 
9 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983) {Steehen D. Krasner ed.); 
Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie,lnternational Urganization: A State of 
theArton an Art of the State, 40 INr'L ORG. 753 (1986); Burley, supra note 7, at 
218-20. 
1° For a Kantian .,;,planation of liberal governance and the relation to in-
ternational trade, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 23-24 {1997); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication 107 YALE 
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tiona! relations theories might reflect themselves in different dis-
pute resolution models in a variety of international trade organi-
• 11 
zat1ons. 
This article attempts to build on this body of work by using 
the major beliefs of liberal IR to evaluate different models of in-
ternational dispute resolution. Liberal IR argues that (1) private 
actors are the fundamental actors in society; (2) governments re-
flect some segment of society; and, (3) states behave according to 
their preferences.12 This article examines the extent to which pri-
vate actors are given roles in international dispute resolution and 
the impact this has on the international organization as well as 
their domestic government. I will examine how different dispute· 
resolution models result in different segments of society being 
represented by their governments and how different models re-
flect and change state actions and preferences. 
2.2. Democracy Deficit 
A more direct line of attack on the legitimacy of international 
organizations comes from many of the scholars focusing on the 
EU. The argument here is that, as power has been centralized in 
the EU and as laws are increasingly passed at the EU level, citi-
zens of member states actually have less ability to influence legis-
lation.13 What started as a union of democratic states actually re-
L.J. 273 (1997);Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International 
Organizations, 17 Nw. J. lNT'LL. & Bus. 398, 424-27 (1997); Walter Mattli & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community Legal System from 
the Ground Up: The Role of Indiviilual Litigants and Na.tional Courts (Harvard 
Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working Papers, No. 1/95}, available 
at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair (visited Apr. 4, 1998} 
<http:/ /www.law.harvard.edU/Programs/JeanMonnet/ >. 
11 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the 
Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 501 (1985} (applying realist 
theory to international trade}; Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmalemg and Dispute 
Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas:An Essay in Trade Governance, 
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997} (apJ?lying mesoinstitutton theory to the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and Interna-
tional Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Or!!anization, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 829 (1995} (setting forth three models of dispute resolUtion based on three 
theoreticil premises}. 
12 See Burley, supra note 7, at 227-28. · 
13 See Weiler, supra note 3; Weiler, et a!., European Democracy and Its Cri-
tique-Five Uneasy Pieces (Harvard Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair 
Workin~ Papers, No. 1/95), available at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet 
Chair (viSited Apr. 4, 1998} <http://www.law.harvard,edu/Programs/ 
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suits in less democracy for their citizens. In order to remedy this 
deficit of democracy, some argue that citizens must be given more 
direct representation at the EU level through the Parliament. 
Some of the reforms of the European Parliament in the Single 
European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht are explained by the 
desire to give citizens more direct voice in EU legislation.14 Oth-
ers argue that the EU has tried (unsuccessfully) to ease concerns of 
democracy by greater transparency and legislative review.15 Citi-
zen participation in trade policy has also become a focus of envi-
ronmental and public interest groups looking at U.S. trade pol-
icy16 in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT")17 
and the World Trade Organization ("WT0").18 
JeanMonnet/ >. 
14 To partially remedy the democracy deficit, the MaaStricht Treaty cre-
ated a co-decision procedure, which essentially gives the European Parliament a 
legislative veto on some matters. See TREATY EsT ABL!SHING THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, Feb. 7 1992, art. 189b, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] C.M.L.R. 573 
(1992) [hereinafter. EC TREATY]; see also Alan Dashwood., Community Legis/a· 
tive Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on EurofJ<!'n Union, 19 EUR. L. REV. 343 
(1994) (discussing changes .to l"$islative procedures resulting from Treaty on 
EU); Trevor Hartley, Constitutzonal and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht 
Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 224-26 (1993); Dieter Kugelmann, The 
Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federdl State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMP. L.J. 335, 346-48 (1994) (discussing relationship between the Treaty and 
democracy). 
IS See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transpdrency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. 
COMM. MKT. STUD. 343 (1994); Imelda Maber, Legislative Review by the EC 
Commission, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 235, 238-240 Go 
Shaw and Gillian More eds., 1995). 
16 See, e.g., DANIEL C. EsT¥, .GREENING THE GATT (1994); Daniel C. 
Esty, NGO's at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Ex· 
elusion, (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on Hie with author); Patti Goldman, 
The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 
CORNELL INT'L L J. 631 (1994) (arguing that the secrecy and lack of public in-
put in U.S. trade policy results in a policy that is biased toward trade liberaliza-
tio~ at the ex_pense. of other values); Robert F. Housman,Democratizi~g In~ 
natwnal Trade Decmon·makmg, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994) (discl!Ssmg 
undemocratic nature of international trade decision-making); Paul B. Stephan, 
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997). Furthermore, in response to complaints 
about lack of transparency, a U.S. District Court ordered the United States 
Trade Representative to grant public access to submissions to GATT dispute 
resolution panels. See Public Cnizen v. Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, 804 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992). 
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AJ, 55 
U.N. T.S.187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
18 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mulitlateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE 
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However, a focus on the democracy deficit alone is too nar-
row. In this view, the level of representation of private actors is 
solely measured in the legislative process. Yet the legislative 
prowess is only part of the equation. Lawmaking also occurs in 
the judicial branch of the EU, through the European Court of 
Justice. Additionally, the greatest changes in breadth, scope, and 
power of the EU have come from the Court, not from legisla-
tion. 19 Therefore, it is also appropriate-and indeed necessary-to 
examine who has the power to compel judicial change. In the 
EU, ironically, its citizens have the greatest ability to participate 
in the dispute resolution process. Instead of a democracy deficit, 
the EU comes closest to achieving democracy in its dispute reso-
lution mechanism compared to other international trade organi-
zations. 
2.3. Trade Liberalism Versus Political Capture by Narrow 
Interests 
A final critique of international trade examines the relation-
ship between the state and its constituents. It is widely believed 
that trade liberalism, while making economic sense to most states3 is difficult to implement in the face of nationalist interests. 2 
First, at the U.S. political level, it has been argued that the execu-
tive branch is the logical protector of free trade, while Congress is 
more likely to want to protect narrow, industrial, protectionist 
interests. 21 Therefore, it is important that the President be given 
power over trade policy so that the broader economic interests of 
the state, and consumers and exporters in particular, will be pro-
tected from the well-funded, well-organized importer lobby. Sec-
ond, on the international level, it has been argued that less trans-
URUGUAY Round vol. 1. (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (hereinafter WTO 
Agreement]. 
19 Weiler, supra note 3, at 2411-20. 
20 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and 
Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 17-18 (1992) (explaining 
Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's economic theories in favor of a hberal trad-
ing~em). 
2 See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275 
(1994}; BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION 
AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (1992}; C. O'Neal Taylor, 
Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: WhY the NAFTA Turned 
Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH.J.INT'LL. &ECON. 1,18-21 (1994). 
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parency for trade deals is useful in shielding trade agreements 
f . fh . a!' 22 rom scrutmy o t ese natton mterests. 
Again, I suggest that this analysis of international trade rela-
tions overlooks the important dimension of dispute resolution. 
The concerns of capture are not only prevalent at the deal making 
stage. Whether or not a trade agreement is enforced clearly brings 
all of the same elements to the table.23 Enforcement can separate 
interests along the importer-exporter divide, along the manufac-
turer-consumer divide, between industries, or between companies. 
Different methods of dispute resolution can either recognize or 
. h . f 24 tgnore t e 1ssue o capture. 
The involvement of private actors in. the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of trade organizations has the ability to reduce the 
linkage between trade and domestic political interests. 25 While 
theoretically this link allows governments to be more responsive 
to their citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics 
keeps governments tethered to special and well-organized interest 
22 See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nong:rvernmental Parties in the 
World Trade ~anization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 295, 319 (1996) ("It can 
be argued that t!ie low public·proft!e of.international trade policy has been one 
of the largest contributors to trade liberalization over the past fifty years."). 
23 See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sowreignty and Regionalism, 27 LAW & 
POL 'y lNT'L Bus. 1073, 1075 (1996} (arguing that supranational dispute settle-
ment can "transcend the day-to-day political maneuvering of member states, lo-
cal bureaucracies, and interest groups"}. 
24 
"The nature of these [GATT] proceedings is not over co. nflicts of inter-
ests among countries but between the general Interest of consumers in liberal 
trade and the general interests of the taxpayers in an efficient government and 
the interests in trade protectionism. They are about redistributiOn of income at 
home." ASIL BULLETIN, No, 9, !MPUCATIONS OF TifE PROUFERATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE REsOLUTION 44 
(1995} (statement of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann};see also John H. Barton & Barry 
E. Carter, International Law and I115titutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 
550, 560 (1993} (arguing that individual.s ouglit to be able to enforce and invoke 
international law). 
25 By using the term "political interest," I am denoting those negative con-
notations of narrow, spectal or otherwise inappropriate interests that can cap-
ture the polity. For more general information on public choice theory, see 
DANIELA. FARBER& PHILIPP. fluCKEY, LAW ANDl'uBUC CHOICE (1991}; 
CHARLES K. ROWLEY & WlLLEM THORBECKE, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND 
TifE EXECUTIVE IN U.S. TRADE POUCY DETERMINATION: A PUBUC CHOICE 
ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993};KAY SCHLOZMAN 
& JOHN TIERNEY, 0RGAN1ZED INTERESTS AND AMERICA DE¥0CRACY, 339-
46 (1986}; Paul B.,.S;ephan, III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory 
and Internationar Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995); 
Symposium, Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167-518. 
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groups. 26 Once a state has determined that it is in its national in-
terest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted un-
der that organization, the link to domestic political interests can 
be reduced by giving private actors standing to enforce the agree-
ment. In that way governments will be responsible for following 
the rules across the board rather than selectively.27 
3. FACTORS IN DETERMINING MODELS OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
Now that I have set forth some of the critiques of the interna-
tional trade system, this Article can turn to better understanding 
the dispute resolution options. In order to determine the level of 
individual involvement there are several factors to examine. 28 
3.1. Direct Effect of Rights 
3.1.1. Definition 
The first factor is whether private actors are directly granted 
rights under the international treaty establishing the trade organi-
zation. The term "self-executing" comes from the idea that the 
treaty executes itself without further legislative action. For those 
who study EU law, the rights under the Treaty of Rome and 
26 See Jeffery Atik, Identifving Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self 
Sacrifice aizd International Tri.de, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J.INT'LECON. L. 201 (1998). 
27 For more on hOw Private actors cah enhance government compliance, 
see Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for lnterna· 
tiona/ Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-
Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J.INT'LL. & Bus. 609 (1996-97). 
28 The factors listed in this section are no doubt incomplete .. Other factors of 
inquiry could include the precedential value of decisions, whether the decision is 
suoject to review or appeal, and whether th. e panel is rotatin~r stan. din~. See, e.g. 
Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Commurlity erience or De:vel· 
oping Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 1993); hilip M. 
Nicliols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. lNT'L L. 379 (1996); Miquel Montana I 
Mora A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of lnterna· 
tionat Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993). I have chosen 
not to discuss those factors because they .focus on those dispute resolution systems 
that already have some sort of decision-making body. ThiS study takes a broader 
approach and does not assume the existence of any such tribunal. · 
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other legislation have been called "directly applicable"29 and are 
said to have "direct effect. "3° For the purposes of this Article, the 
differences among the three phrases will be overlooked/1 and I 
will use the term "direct effect" to mean those treaties that give 
private actors immediate rights and under which no further do-
mestic legislative action is necessary. 
3.1.2. Why Directly Effective Rights Are Important 
Directly effective rights are an important issue in treaty law 
because the scope and depth of the treaty will vary depending on 
whether private actors will also be involved in the implementa-
tion of the treaty. Those treaties under which private actors get 
rights give these private actors another legal basis for protecting 
their rights under the law. 
The issue of direct effect globally has most commonly arisen 
under human rights treaties, which are clearly drafted in order to 
protect and benefit individuals.32 In the United States, the con-
tinual debate over self-executing treaties re-emerges every time a 
new h1.1man rights treaty comes up for ratification in the U.S. 
Senate. The Senate is traditionally reluctant to grant direct effect 
to these treaties because these treaties may provide additional 
29 See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Trans{'ort-en Expeditie Onderneming 
Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandSe Administrat1e der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 
[hereinafter Van Gend en Loos ). 
30 See Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato v. Sim-
menthal SpA (ll), 1978 E.C.R. 629; see also, Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effects of 
International Economic Law in the United States and the EU, 17 Nw. J. oo'L L. 
& Bus. 556 (1996-97); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant 
Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983). For discussion of 
"direct effect• see T. HARTI.EY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN 
CoMMUNTIYLAW 183-218 (1988). 
31 This is not to say that the difference between direct applicability and di-
rect effect is not important or has not occupied many {'ages of academic discus-
sion. See, e.g., J.A. Winter, Direct Applica/3ility and D•rect Effect:· Two Distinct 
and Different Concepts in Commumty Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 425 
(197~. 
3 See, e.g., Convention AJ!;ainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishr...ent, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20; 
Tntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for sirPture Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter 
ICCPR); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of t e Crime of 
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also David Weissbrodt, 
United States &tification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 
(1978) (discussing the Human Rights Covenants and President Carter's propos-
aJs for tbem). 
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rights not provided under the Constitution.33 In keeping with the 
Senate's traditional isolationist approach to foreign relations, the 
idea that international law may differ or go further than U.S. do-
mestic law remains anathema to many members of Congress and 
other citizens.34 Thus, when the United States recently ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR"), the United States made a specific reservation stating 
that the ICCPR would not be self-executing.35 This has been the 
typical practice with most recently ratified human rights treaties. 
International trade treaties in the United States are also tradition-
ally not self-executing.36 They usually need additional implement-
" For example, the ICCPR calls for the elimination of the death penalty 
for juveniles under 18. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held that 
the death penalty is permitted against juveniles to the age of 16. See Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
W. hile many countries around the world have eliminated the death eenalty, the 
United States has expanded its use. See International Comm'n of jurists, Ad· 
ministration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 165 
(1997). 
. 
34 See, e.g., U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH 
OR WITHOUT REsERVATIONS, (Richard B. Lillich ed, 1981); M. Cheri£ Bas-
siouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169 (1993) 
(discussing the U.S. concerns in ratification of the ICCPR); Kerri Ann Law, 
Hope for the Future: Overcoming jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States 
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1851 (1994) (discussing the reasons the United States should ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child); Ann Elizabeth Mayer,Ref/ec· 
tions on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDA W: Should the Constitu· 
tion Be an ObStacle to Human Rights?, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996) 
(discussing the U.S. reaction to Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women); Jordan J. Paust,Avoiding 'Fraudulent' Execu· 
tive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-EX£cution of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) (Ciiscussing the U.S. decision to make 
ICCPR non-self-executing). 
35 The ICCPR was adopted by the United States on September 8, 1992. 
The U.S. Senate gave the requisite advice and consent to the treaty, together 
with the declaration "[ t ]hat tlie United States declares that the yrovis10ns of Ar-
ticles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing. . . . 138CONG. REG 
54,784; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (1994) (setting fortli the implementing lan-
gua~e of the Genocide Convention). 
6 See JOHN H JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POUCY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-105 (1997) {discussing 
broadly U.S. law and the application of international trade treaties); John H. 
Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65 
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (reviewing the history 
of the application of trade treaties in U.S.law). 
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ing legislation or rule-making in order to have any force in do-
mestic U.S. law. 
On the other hand, when we discuss trade organizations, the 
private actor involvement is .particularly appropriate. After all, 
states intend to design trade treaties to encourage private actors to 
import and export from other private actors. In order to encour-
age this trade, treaties require that states do not take actions that 
would adversely affect these private actors. Historically, the very 
basis of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties was to pro-
vide protection for private actors from unfair governmental 
treatment. Even at the lowest level of economic interaction, bi-
lateral investment treaties today require that governments treat 
citizens and noncitizens equally. States grant private actors these 
rights as national treatment37 or a minimum standard of treat-
ment38 in the host state. Once states choose. to join international 
37 Th~ notion that individuals granted tights under national treatment will 
receive the same treatment as the state's nationals is referred to as the "Equality 
of Treatment Doctrine." Though gaining popular sil.Pport world wide, it has 
been the doctrine historically preferred by communiSt and Third World na-
tions. "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" between the U.S. 
and other nations used the national treatment standard. See, e.g., Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, para. 
1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067. ("Nationals and companies of either Party shall lie ac-
corded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to 
access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies 
within the territories of the other Party ... both in pursuit and in defense of 
their rights."). 
38 According to the Minimum Standard of International Justice, a state 
must accord an alien with at least a minimum standard of treatment, even if this 
means a:n alien would ·receiVe better treatment -th:in the state's own nationals. 
This doctrine was traditionally favored by Western nations, particularly with 
regard to states with a poor record on human rights. However, third world na-
tions have feared that the use of a minimum standard will be used as a cover for 
privileged _status with regards to investments, inheritance and ownership of 
property. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western 
and Th:Td World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 {1983). 
Interestingly, more recent U.S. treaties combine both the national treatment 
and the nunirnum standard. For example, in the one Treaty of Friendship with 
Belgium it is written that 
Each Contractin_g Party shall at all times accord equitable 
treatment and effective protection to the persons, property, 
enterprises, rights and interests of nationals and companies of 
the other Party .... Nationals of either Contracting Party 
within the temtories of the other Party shall be accorded full 
legal and judicial protection for their persons, rights, and in-
terests. Such nationals shall be free from molestation and 
shall receive constant protection in no case less than reqnired 
by international law. To this end they shall in particular have 
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trade organizations, the requirement of fair treatment for nonciti-
zens includes freedom from unfair taxation, unfair government 
regulation, unequal tariffs and unequal nontariff barriers. Basi-
cally, trade treaties provide a set of rights for private actors against 
governments. 
Yet, trade treaties are currently structured so as to provide 
states these rights on behalf of their citizens rather than granting 
these rights directly to the citizens. Because trade treaties most 
affect private actorsj it only makes sense that these rights have ap-
propriate remedies. 9 As Stefan Riesenfeld argued almost twenty-
right of access, on the same basis and on the same conditions 
as nationals of such other Party, to the courts of justice and 
administrative tribunals and agencies in all degrees of jurisdic-
tion and shall have right to die services of competent persons 
of their choice. 
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, U.S.-Belg., 
arts. 1, 3(1), (2), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1286, 1288-89; While in an investment treaty 
with Argentina, it is written: · 
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities. as-
sociated therewith, on a basis no less favorable. than that ac-
corded in like sitUations to investment or asSociated aciivitifs 
of its own nationals or companies, Or of nationals or .compa· 
nies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable, 
subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain excep-
tions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in die 
Protocol to this Treaty ... Investment shall at all times be ac-
corded fair and equitabl~ treatmentbshall enjoy full protection 
and secunty and shall m no case e accordeCI treatment less 
than that required by international law. 
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and .Protection of Invest-
ment, Nov., 14 1991, Arg-U.S., 31 I.L.M. 124. 
,. As Andreas Lowenfeld stated, 
I have never believed that a right without a remedy ·is no right 
at all. But there can be no doubt that the closer a legal system 
comes to affording remedies for breaches of rules, the stronger 
are the rights it confers, and the more reliance can be placed 
on the rules. 
Andreas Lowenfelcl, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New 
GA 1T, 88 AM. J. lNT'L L. 471, 488 (1994). For more on rights without reme-
dies in the domestic context, see Richard H. Fallon, fr.,Individual Rights and 
the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 1993 (giving context to indi-
vidual's riidits in a structured society); Richard J. Fa! on, Jr. & Daniel J. Melt-
zer, New law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. 
REv. 1731 (1991) (examining the concept of"new" law in criminal cases from 
the~erspective of the law of remedies in the constitutional context); Donald H. 
Zei er, Rights Require Remedie~· A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights 
in e Federal Courts, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 665 (1987) (arguing that courts must 
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five years ago, direct effect of rights and proper judicial remedies 
are necessary to the continued development of free trade.4° Fur-
thermore, without appropriate remedies, these rights often are left 
unprotected and unenforced. Increased legitimacy and effective-
ness of international trade organizations require individual in-
volvement, not only at the sta~e of lawmaking, but also at the 
stage of remedying lawbreaking. 1 
3.1.3. How Rights Become Directly Effective 
In many states other than the United States, international 
treaties are automatically self-executing and, at ratification, grant 
individual citizens the rights outlined in the treaty on the same 
basis as the state itself. Language granting individual ri~ts under 
international treaties can be outlined in the constitution 2 or legis-
lation. 43 Still other states grant individual rights under treaties 
through the evolution of judicial decisions that have held the 
rights to be self-executing or directly effective.44 In the United 
States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Japanese 
individual was granted rights directly under the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation signed between Japan and the 
United States.45 Similarly, although direct effect was not clearly 
presume enforcement of a law absent a showing that greater harm will occur to 
a plaintiff from enforcing these rights). 
'"' See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Le$al Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 
22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415, 443 (1974). 
41 In fact, the American Bar Association ("ABA") supported expanding the 
right of private parties to bring cases under NAFTA. See Int'l Law and Practice 
Section, American Bar Ass'n, Reports to the House of Delegates, 26 lNT'L LAW. 
855, 859 (1992). See also, Joint Working Group on the Settlement of Int'l Dis-
putes, Canadian and American Bar Ass'ns, Settlement of Disputes Under the Pro-
posed Free Trade A rea Agreement, 22 INT'L LAW 879 (1988) (proposing a refer-
ence procedure from national courts in which individuals coUld bring cases to a 
Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal). 
42 SeeSTATUUTNED. [Constitution] art. 91 (Neth.). 
43 For example, under the law of the United Kingdom, "although the ex-
ecutive has a largely unfettered power to enter into treaty obligations, such ob-
ligations normally need to be transformed into domestic law oy legislation be-
fore they can be enforced by British courts." Nicholas Grief, Constitutional 
Law and International Law, in UNITED KINGDOM LAW IN TiiE MID-19905 
76,88 Q"ohn W. Bridge et a!. eds., 1994). . 
44 See Etat Beige, Ministre des Affaires Economiques c. Societe Anoyme 
From~erie Franco-Suisse Le Ski', Cour des Cass., 158 Pasic. 1971-I (1971) 
(Belfs) (ruling on the supremacy of the self-executing treaties over national law). 
See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (detailing suit of a 
Japanese national by the City of Seattle for the ability to open a pawn shop). 
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written into the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice 
("ECJ") found that the rights in the treaty did have direct effect. 46 
Under case law from the ECJ, citizens of member states of the 
EU are also granted rights directly from EU legislation. 47 This 
direct effect under the Treaty of Rome is already quite revolu-
tionary in comparison to most international treaties. 48 Because 
the practice of granting direct effect varies by state, it is necessary 
The Court quoting language from the treaty, "[t]he citizens ... of each of the 
High Contracting Parties shall have the liberty to ... reside in the territories of 
the otherto carry on trade ... " held in favor oft he Japanese national. See id. at 
340. For more on self-executing treaties, see J or daD. J. Paust, Self-Executing 
Treaties, 82 AM J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vasg_ues, Ibe Four Doc-
trines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). See also Charles 
D. Siegel, Individual Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties-Dr. AI· 
varez Machain's Case, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP L. J. 765 (1991) (detailing 
case ruling that a Mexican fugitive wanted for a U.S. murder who was kid-
napped haa to be released because Mexico had protested under its rights under a 
treaz). · 
See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1. This decision was controversial at 
the time and, it was argued, beyond the scope of the ECJ. See id., at 19 
(Opinion of the Advocate General Karl Roemer) (protesting the decision); P.P. 
Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC 
Law, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 458-63 (recounting criticisms of the 
case). 
47 The ECJ has interpreted the language of Article 189 as conferring rights 
upon the nationals of Member States in certain circumstances. The direct effect 
of the legislation, treaty article, or decision is, in essence, what constitutes the 
right. The Court has Clistinguished vertical direct effect, the rights of an indi-
viaual to sue a governmental entitY,, from horizontal direct effect, the right of 
an individual to sue another individual. The Court has acknowledged vertical 
dire~ effect involving disputes arising from treaty articles, regulations, and d!-
rect,lves. See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Naz!-
onale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R.585; Case 41/74, VanDuyn v. Home 
Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & S.-W. 
Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723. However, the Court has not 
been so lenient on the rights of individuals established by horizontal direct ef-
fect. Although the Courts have reco~nized horizontal direct effect in disputes 
arising from treaty articles and regulations, Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe 
Anonyme Beige De Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 the Court re-
fuses to acknowledge horizontal direct effect in disputes arising from directives. 
See Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Commercial Internacional De Ali-
mentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. I-4135. . 
48 See Brand, supra note 30; David O'Keefe, Judicial Protection of the Indi-
vidual by the European Court of justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 901 (1996); 
Louis F. Del Duca, Teaching of t'he European Community Experience {or Develop-
ing Regional On!anizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 ft993). In fact, the EU 
dOes not proviae direct effect for other international treaties including the 
GATT. See Brand, supra note 30, at 575-93 (1997). 
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to examine the language of the treaty, the member states' prac-
tices, and any judicial interpretations of the treaty. 
3.2. Standing Before the Dispute Resolution Body 
3.2.1. No Standing 
Under some treaties, all disputes are resolved between states 
through diplomacy. Alternatively, the dispute resolution system 
is a court or tribunal that is only open to states, as is the case with 
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Evolving from the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration,49 the ICJ is the most recognized 
international court.50 In the trade arena, the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding is closest to this type of international ad-
judication. In either instance, private actors have no official role 
in dispute resolution. 
Historically under international law, only a state could sue 
another state and demand reparation for the injuries inflicted on 
its citizens. The injured private actor did not have a directly en-
forceable claim against a state that violated his rights.51 There-
fore, it was up to each state to determine if, when, and how to 
press claims for injury to its own citizens. 52 A state could clearly 
choose not to pursue this remedy. 53 
49 On July 29, 1899, at the first Ha~e Peace Conference, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration ("PCA ") was estabhshed. The Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes detailed the PCA, which was to become 
the first dispute settlement mechanism between sovereign states. See Bette E. 
Shifman, The Revitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 INT'L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 284 (1995). 
50 The Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") was established 
in 1921 by the League of Nations. The Court, heard 32 cases and issued 27 ad-
visory Oj>inions to international organizations. At the end of World War II, 
the estaolishment of the United Nations (UN) sparked the need for a new 
world court in consideration of concerns by the parties who were not signato-
ries to the League of Nations. The new world court, the International Court of 
Justice was, thus, formed in 1945. See Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, june 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 5 . 
See Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. ~er. A) No. 6, at 
28 .Guly 2:;:) (Merits): ("The rules of law governing the reparat10n are the rules 
of mtertiat10nallaw m force between the two States concerned, and not the law 
governin~ relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and 
the individual who has suffered damage."). 
52 The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that: 
It is an elementary l'rinciple of international law that a State is 
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary 
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Private suits in domestic courts were also not an option. 
Many states had laws that limited grounds on which they could 
be sued in their own courts which meant that foreign investors 
had little recourse to that domestic legal system. 54 Even if a pri-
vate actor wanted to bring a suit in his own home court against 
the foreign state, most developed states had laws that provided · 
foreign sovereign immunity.55 Moreover, private actors had no 
international recourse in the case of a violation by their own gov-
ernment. 
Today, under a treaty with no standing for private actors, pri-
vate actors are involved only to the extent that they lobby their 
governments to represent their interests and to protect their in-
dustries. Examples of this would be the United States negotiating 
to international law committed by another State, from whom 
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the or-
dinary channels. By taking up the case qf one of its subjects 
and l:iy resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial 
P.roceecl!ngs. on his bel:ialf, ~ State is in reality asse':l:ing 1ts own 
nghts-lts r1ght to ensure, m the person of Its subjects, respect 
for the rules of international law: 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 13 (Aug. 
30) ~urisdiction). 
3 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (involving U.S. gov-
ernment reliisal to espouse the claims of the plaintiff against the government of 
Saudi Arabia). Individuals have traditionally been able to request that their 
government espouse their claims before the ICJ or other international court. 
See Lotus, (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (SeJ>t. l);see also David M. 
Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the !nternational Court 
of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 435 (1996) 
(analyzing U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan and the denial of indi-
viduals to bring a case in front of the ICD. · · 
54 In most countries the ~overnment had full sovereign immunity both in 
law and in practice. See Loms L. Jaffe, Suits A¥finst Government an4 Officers: 
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963); see also United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196 (1882) (stating that the United States may only be sued by its own 
consent). 
55 See, e.g., Forei~n Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 
(1994) ("Subject to eXISting international agreements to which the United States 
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided 
[in the exceptions]."); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.) (granting immu-
nity in the UnitedKmgdom to the sovereign). 
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with Japan to open its automobile market56 or negotiating with 
Russia regarding regional investment. 57 · 
3.2.2. Petition Domestically for Government to Represent 
A second option is that private actors have the right to peti-
tion their governments to bring a dispute to the system. While 
private actors do not have the opportunity to directly bring their 
cases, the government may be persuaded through formal mecha-
nisms that a dispute is sufficiently serious to warrant their atten-
tion. The closest example of this in the United States is the so-
called "301 procedure" for the United States Trade Representative 
("USTR "). 5 While the state still makes the final decision about 
whether or not to bring such a case, there are formal mechanisms 
for private actors to become involved at the domestic level in this 
dispute resolution system. 59 Because the USTR's decisions have 
56 See High Level Talks Slated with Japan on Auto Agreement, 14 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1714 {Oct. 8, 1997). 
57 See U.S., Russia Sign Cooperation Accords, Focus on Investment in Russia's 
Regions, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1633 (Sept. 24, 1997). 
58 Section 301 allows· an individual to petition the United States govern-
ment to initiate trade dispute resolutions. Under Section 302 a party can peti-
tion the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government's poli-
cies or practices that are suspected to be hindering trade. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412-
14 (1994). The USTR, under section 304, must investigate and determine if the 
fore1gn government has violated a trade agreement, benefits of any trade agree-
ment are unreasonably being denied to the individual, or the foreign govern-
ment is unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. commerce. See id. § 2414. If 
the dispute involves a trade agreement the USTR is obligated under section 
303{a)(2) to flrst use the dispute settlement procedures provided under that 
agreement. See id. § 2413. For example, if a dispute involves infringements 
based on one of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the USTR must utilize the 
dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization. If the USTR fmds 
that a trade infringement is occurring and is convinced that the dispute should 
involve action by the United States it will pursue resolution of the dispute. 
The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can request the EU take 
action against those governments violatmg free trade agreements. See Council 
Regulation 3286/94, 1994 O.J. {L 349) 71 [the Trade Barriers Regulation] 
~aying down EU procedures in the Held of common commercial policy). 
59 Out of the 23 section 301 cases initiated by an individual between 1985 
and 1996, 11 GATT panels were established. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits 
of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organizations Dispute Set· 
ilement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 {1997). See also A. Lynne 
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current Development, Rules, Sanctions and 
Enforcement under Section 301; At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 
{1996) (detailing conflicts between Section 301 and WTO policy); Jared R. Sil-
verman, Multilateral Resolution CYVer Unilateral Retaliation: Adju(f;cating the Use 
ofSection 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J.INT'LECON. L. 233 {1996). 
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not been reviewed by the judiciary, 60 a private actor seeking dis-
pute resolution of his claim in this manner will likely have no re-
course if the USTR decides to take no action. 
3.2.3. Individual Arbitration 
Private actors can also be granted standing before an interna-
tional arbitration board. Such a dispute resolution mechanism 
permits standing for private actors directly affected by laws in the 
state in which they are investing. The move toward investment 
arbitration began with the creation of the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") under the aegis 
of the World Bank.61 In the model of investment arbitration un-
der ICSID, private actors can bring cases against states. ICSID has 
jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising out of an investment be-
tween a member state and a national of another member state.62 
To initiate proceedings under ICSID, a party must submit a writ-
ten request to the Secretary -General of I CSID detailing the issues 
in dispute, the parties, and consent to arbitration. Once certified 
by the Secretary-General of ICSID, a private actor can have the 
case heard by an arbitral panel established by ICSID.63 This 
model of permitting private actors to bring cases against states has 
60 The USTR has discretion in determining whether to initiate investi~a­
tions from the petitions filed by interested individuals. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) 
(2). If the USTR decides not to investigate, notice of such a determination with 
an ex.P.lanation of reasons must be pul:ilished in the Federal Register. See id. § 
2412(a) {3). But see Erwin Eichman & Gary Horlick, Political Questions in In· 
tematlonal Trade: judicial Review of Section 301, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L 735 (1989) 
(~ing that a denial by the USTR to pursue investigations of an individual's 
petttion should be reviewed by the judic•ary). . . . . 
61 ICSID was established bythe Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signa· 
ture Mar. 18, 19651 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Con-
vention]. See also Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute 
Settlement Procedures: The Res.ime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & 
POL 'Y INT'L BUS. 633, 655-56 (1995). 
62 See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 25. The parties must, how-
ever, consent to the use of the arbitration facility. Id; The use of ICSID has 
not been initiated by a Contracting State in complaint of an individual of an-
other Contracting State even though the potential exists under the Convention 
provisions. See David A. Solely, ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative 
to International Conflict, 19INT'LL. 521 {1985). 
63 . 
· See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 36. Uuless the Secretarr.-
General fmds that the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of ISCID, he will 
register the request and notify the parties. See id. art. 36{3). 
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since been copied in bilateral investment treaties in order to en-
courage foreign direct investment64 and outlined in the North 
American Free Trade AJ~reement ("NAFTA") for investor dis-
putes under Chapter 11.6 These treaties outline limited standing 
provisions and permit only those private actors with investments 
in the state to bring such a dispute against a state. 
3.2. 4. Private Actors Before a Court 
The furthest evolution of individual standing is when private 
actors have the ability to bring a case themselves to an interna-
tional tribunal.66 In the EU, private actors have the right to bring 
64 See, e.g., Investment Treaty with the Republic of Armenia, Sept. 23, 
1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-11, art. VI (1992). 
65 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289, ch. 20. [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA provides the opportunity under its 
investment arbitration chapter to have arbitration under ICSID or Arbitration 
Rules of the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law 
("UNCITRAL") rules. Arbitration under ICSID rules is available to member 
countries and nationa4 of member countries. Disputes where ouly one of the 
countries concerned is a member of ICSID are earned out under the Additional 
Facility Rules of ICSID. Because Canada and Mexico are not yet members of 
ICSID, arbitration is only available under the Additional Facility Rules when 
one of the countries involved is the United States. The first two NAFTA cases 
using the ICSID Additional Facility Rules were registered in January and 
March, 1997,' and involve U.S. nationals versus the Mexican government. See 
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARII (AF)/97 /1); Robert Azinian 
v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97 /2). See generally First ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Proceedings Under the NAFTA, 14 NEWS FROM ICSID, 1, 6, 10 
(1997) (No. 1). Arbitrations involving only Canada and Mexico must be re-
solved using the UNCITRAL rules as the ICSID facility is not available where 
neither country is a member .. UNCITRAL rules are reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 
(1976). A model similar. to il!vestor arbitration is also established in the Envi-
ronmental .Side Accord to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, entered into fo"'e Jan. 1, 1994, art. 14(1), 32 I.L.M. 
1480. For further information on tlie implementation of the Environmental 
Accord see David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the 
Early Experience 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 184-191 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Interna-
tional "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on 
Env_ironmenta~ r;:oop_eration, 36 .VA./. INT'L L. 721 (1996); Rex J. Ze<Wis, 
. Clazms by Indzviduals m Internatzona Econorrizc Law: NAFI'A Deve[opments, 7 
AM. REv. INT'LARB. 115 (1996). 
66 The first court to provide standing for· individuals was the Central 
American Court of Justice created in ·1907 ·by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Although the court's existence was short lived, 
it was the first court to allow individual claims to be brought against the con-
tracting states. Individuals were barred from bringing suit agrunst their own 
nation and were required to demonstrate an exhaustiOn of local remedies before 
bringing an action before the court. All of the five cases brought by individuals 
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a case directly to the ECJ in certain circumstances. 67 Cases 
brought before the ECJ based on a reference made by a domestic 
68 Th· . b . hi court are more common. e pnvate actor nngs a case to s 
or her national court. That court then can refer the question of 
EU law to the ECJ. In either case, the result is the opportunity 
for private actors to ar~me and defend their rights in front of an 
international tribunal.69 El Mercado Comun del Sur 
against a contracting state within the ten year existence of the Central Ameri-
can Court resulted m favor of the contracting states. See P.K. Menon, The In-
ternational Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the 
Traditional Doctrine, 1 J, TRANSNAT'L L. & POL 'Y 151, 159 (1992) (citing Con-
vention for the Establishment of Central American Court of Justice, Dec. 20, 
1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (Supp. 1908)). 
67 Article 173 of the EC Treaty provides an individual with the opportu-
nity to institute l?roceedings not only involving decisions·explicitly against that 
person, but also mvolving any directive or regUlation that is of direct .and indi-
vidual concern to that individual. The courts, however, have been reluctant to 
allow all directives and regulations to be challenged. Compare Joined Cases 16 
& 17/62, Confederation Nationale des Productents de Fruits et Legumes v. 
Council1962 E.C.R. 47 (denyr,:· standing to fruit and vegetable producers peti-
tionin~ to annul a Council re ation advancing a common market in the in· 
dustry with Case 730/79, Phi •p Morris Holland v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 
2671 ermitting standing for a cigarette manufacturer seeking to annul the 
Commission's denial of permission to Holland for the.granting of state aid for 
the expansion of cigarette production). For more information. on the applica-
tion of Article 173, see Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for 
Annulment under Article 173 oj the EC Treaty, 32 COMMON MK.T. L. REV. 7 
(199~. . . 
6 
• A~icle 177 of the EC Treatyf~ov:id~ guidance :o.the do'!'~ticcourt;s in 
refernng ISSUes to the ECJ. The EC 1S hnilted to prov1ding prel!ffi!nary ruhngs 
only on issues regarding the interpretation of the Treaty, the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the Community's institutions, and the interpretations of 
any statutes that provide for such a means of clarification. See H.P. Bulmer Ltd. 
v. J. Bollinger S.A., [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 91 (1974) (U.K.) (holding that English 
judJ>es are the final court to apply commumty law, but the ultimate authority 
on mterpreting community law goes to the ECD; Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT v. 
Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 (ruling that a national court is required to 
refer cases where there is no judicial remedy in the member. state but there is a 
question of Community law raised). The use of Artick 177 mitigates the strin-
. gent standing requirement set forth by Article 173. Thus, an individual who 
does not have a direct and ~divi_dual concer':' to introduce a case· directly t? the 
ECJ can commence the act1on m a domestic court and request a prehmmary 
rulmg from the Eq. See Amull, supra, note 61, at 40-9 (describin~ the com-
bined effect of Article 173 and 177); see also Schaefer, supra, note 27 (discussing 
rights and remedies to brin~ claims under international dispute settlement sys-
tems and in domestic courts). · · . 
. 
69
. Case law in the EU has also determined that an individual may sue other 
individuals in orde.r to pro~ct his rights '!n~er Community law .. The concept is 
referred to as honzontal direct effect (dist1rict from vert1cal direct effect, the 
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("MERCOSUR", or the "Common Market of the South") also 
modeled its system of dispute resolution upon the EU where pri-
vate actors can go to either the MERCOSUR court or their na-
. al 70 t10n court. 
We cannot underestimate the impact of individual involve-
ment in international dispute resolution?1 Private actors play the 
important function of private enforcement agents.72 · As such, pri-
vate actors can themselves ensure that the law is being followed 
rather than relying on states or an oversight body (such as the 
Commission in the case of the EU) to bring a case. States may 
feel reluctant to bring cases against other states for somewhat mi-
nor infractions as the diplomatic ramifications may not be worth 
the trouble. Furthermore, it may be in many states' interests not 
to follow the letter of the law exactly or to take their time in 
litigation between an individual and a government entity). Horizontal direct 
effect conclusively exists in issues involving conflicts arismg from articles and 
regulations of the Community. See Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R. 455. However, the 
question of horizontal effect m confl_ic!S ar~ing over directives has not been as 
favorable. · See Case 91/92, Faccm1-Don v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 3325 
(confirming the traditional view that horizontal direct effect does not exist in 
ilisputes involving directives rather than followins the Advocate General's ad-
vice to further die scope of direct effect). If the mdividual is denied access to 
the ECJ to sue another individual, he may still have an opportunity to com: 
mence an action against the Member State for noncompliance with Commu-
nity law by not properly implementing the specific directive. See Case C-
106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 
[1992]1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992) (Spain) (emphasizing that the States have a duty to 
implement directives in a manner so as to achieve the intended result of the 
Community as closely as possible). 
70 See MERCOSUR: Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes, 
Dec. 17, 1991, repr!nted in36 LL.M. 691; Cherie O'Neal Taylor,Dispute Resolu-
tion as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integra-
tion: NAFTA andMERCOSUR?, 17 NW. J.INT'LL. & Bus. 850 (1996-97). 71 For a review of the most recent literature assessing the impact of indi-
vidual litigants and EU law, see Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter,Revisit-
ing the Eurqpean Court of justice, 52INT'L ORG. 177 (1998). 
n See Weiler, supra note 3, at 2421 (notin~ im~ortance of citizens to the 
EU judicial system); P.P. Craig, supra note 46 (1992 (arguing that private en-
forcement agents are critical to the EU system of · rect effect). See generally 
Dinah Shelton, 1be Participation of Nongover>Jmental Organizations in Interna-
tional judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (calling for greater ac-
ceptance of nongovernmental organizations acting as amici curiae by interna-
tional courts). 
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complying with the numerous laws set out under the EU-a kind 
of willing collusion to ignore the law.73 
While an oversight body is more likely to bring cases, it also 
has the problem of measuring the value of a vast number of cases 
and keeping straightening out its own political agenda. In addi-
tion, an oversight body probably will not have sufficient re-
sources to check compliance with all laws nor to bring all the 
cases of noncompliance to the court. Private actors, on the other 
hand, do not have the political baggage of bringing a case against 
another state. Private actors can make a direct economic assess-
ment about whether it is worth it to them to spend the time and 
money on litigation. Where private actors are granted rights and 
where the benefits of the treaty are supposed to accrue directly ·to 
private actors, it makes sense to give private actors a remedy for 
. I . f h . h 74 vw anon o t ose ng ts. 
3.3. Supremacy over Domestic Law 
3.3.1. Definition 
A crucial factor in examining the rights of private actors is the 
extent to which the system creates binding law for the member 
states. Supremacy can be clearly defined for international law-be 
it treaty or decision from the dispute resolution tribunal-to be 
supreme to domestic law. Yet states vary widely on their use, 
adoption, and interpretation of international law. 
73 See Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Cap.italist Society: The 
Court of Justice, Social Policy, and billividual Rights Under the European Com· 
munities Legal Order, 37 HARv. INT'LL.J. 307 (1996). . . 
74 This avenue provided the court with the ol'portunity to decide some of 
the most important cases in the judicial history of the ECJ. Furthermore, the 
ECJ hears more cases as preliminary references under ArtiCle 177 than directly. 
In the early years of the EEC, from 1958 to 1973, nearly two-thirds of all cases 
in front of tl1e ECJ carne through J?reliminary rulings. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, 
Legal S'lstems of Regional EconomiC lntegratwn,. 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 426 
(1974) tciting to Commission's Annual General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities). This use of Article 177 references continues to increase. In 
1993, the ECJ received 203 references which more than doubled the number of 
cases in 1980. See Sarah E. Strasser, Evolution & Effort: The Development of a 
Strategy of Docket Control for the European Court of Justice & the Question of Pre. 
liminary References (Harvard Law School Harvarcf jean Monnet Chair Working 
Pa_P,ers, No. 3/95), available at ;,onathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair 
(v•sited Apr. 4, 1998) <http:/ www.law.harvard.edu/Prograrns/Jean Mon-
~>. . . 
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3.3.2. Treaties Equal with National Law 
Some states, including the United States, treat international 
treaties as equal to national law. For example, the U.S. Constitu-
tion states that treaties are the supreme law of the land.75 Under 
rules of interpretation, this means that a later law trumps the law 
which preceded it.76 The Supreme Court has thus stated that, 
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, 
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation .... 
When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will 
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to 
both, if that can be done without violating the language of 
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date 
will control the other, provided always the stipulation of 
the treaty on the subject is self -executing. 77 
In practice, a national law could overrule an international treaty 
under this treatment of internatioylllaw,78 but it still places in-
ternational treaties above state law. 
. 
75 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. {"This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land ... .") This interpretation of treaties is similar to the 
one in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in which 
courts have found international treaties to be equal to national law. In these 
countries, ho~ever,, separate implementing legislation b~yond . ratification is 
needed to provide direct ·effect under these treaties. In reality, this has been the 
case in the United States in _more recent treaty implementation where treaties 
:u-e no~ gi-:en direct ~ffect.unless express!y provided for in separate implement-
mg legislation. See discussion supra Sect10n 3.1. · 
76 
. See C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 
42 MJNN .. L. REv. 709, 751 (1958) ("[T]he courts have consistently held that 
treaties and statutes are mentioned in terms of equal dignity in the supremacy 
clause, and therefore in the event of a conflict between them whichever is later 
in time must prevail."). q: United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. 
Supp. 1456 (S:D.N.Y .. 1988) (holding that a subsequent statute would only su-
persede a treaty if that were the explicit purpose of the statute). 
77 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 {1888). 
78 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. lNT'L L. 479 {1990) 
(an~g GATT). 
The Supreme Court has declared that legislation enacted by the .federal 
government in order to implement the objectives of a treaty agreement will be 
superior to any legislation enacted by the states. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 
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3.3.3. Treaties Supreme to National Law 
Another approach to international law is that it is supreme to 
domestic law. Therefore, no national law, no matter when it is 
passed, ever trumps an international law. Examples of countries 
that follow this approach include Belgium, France, and Holland.80 
A modification of this approach. is that international law is su-
preme to all law except for the constitution or basic law of the 
state, as is the case in Germany and Italy. 81 
3.3.4. Difference Between International Treaties and 
International Decisions 
As the U.S. Constitution discusses only those treaties con-
cluded under Article II procedures, 82 it is left to the judiciary un-
U.S. 416 {1920) (holding that a treaty with Canada rei(Uiating the hunting of 
migratory birdS IS constitutional and any federal legisTation therein will pre-
empt state law). The Supreme Court furthered this notion by statin~ that a 
self-executing treao/ will preempt state law, even with no federal legislation. See 
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) {reaffirming the 
superiority of treaties to state law governing Natiye American fishing rights). 
For more information on state law preemption see generally, Harola Maier, 
Preemption of State Law: A Reconim'ended Analysis, 83 AM. J. lNT'L L. 832 
{1989). . . 
80 In Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, the constituti~n or courts have 
accorded self-executing treaties supremacY over prior or subseqUent _domestic 
l!f;;islation. See CONST. art. 55 (Fr.); STATUUT NED. [Constitution], art. 94 
(Neth.). ·· 
81 Article 25 of the Basic Law of Germany seeins to grant both direct effect 
and sul'reinacy_to international law: "The general rules of public international 
law.sha!l be an mteual part of the federal law. They shall.take precedence over 
the laws and shall directly create rightS and duties for the inhabitants of the fed-
eral territory." GRUNDGESETZ [<:;onstitution] [GG], art. 25: In practice, the 
German Constitutional Court lias retained its ability to review mternational 
law, including legislation of the EU and rulings of the ECJ, to ensure its com-
pliance with the Basic Law of Germanr (the German Constitution). See 
BVerfGE 89, 155 {the Maastricht Decision); :lriternationale Handelsgesefischaft 
mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel {"Solange I"), 
BVerfGE 37, 271, translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; In re Wunsche Han-
delsgesellschaft ("Solange II"), BVerfGE 73, 339, translated in [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 
225; Dieter Gnmm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The 
German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 CoLUM J. 
EUR. L. 229 {1997). Both Germany and Italy required separate constitutional 
provisions to accept the supremacy of EU law. See Mattli & Slaughter, supra 
note 71, at 203. 
82 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur .... "). 
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der U.S.law whether decisions of international tribunals are to be 
treated the same way. This problem exists in other states as well. 
Even those states that find international treaties supreme to their 
national law have not necessarily treated international decisions 
the same way. While national constitutions may have envisioned 
international treaties and made provisions for their supremacy, 
few constitutions make provisions for decisions of international 
tribunals. This can be attributed to two reasons. First, when 
most state's drafted their constitutions, international decision-
making bodies did not exist. Second, in the case of arbitration de-
cisions, the arbitrator generally provides for damages and not a 
change in the domestic laws. 83 The issue of supremacy does not 
really arise because there is no new law created. Therefore, we 
must examine what provisions the international trade treaty has 
made regarding supremacy and how the member states have in-
terpreted and acted upon this treaty. Only the EU has evolved to 
the point where ECJ decisions are supreme over national law in 
. . 84 . . 
all the member states; 
3.3.5. National judges' Ability to Overrule National Law 
One last factor in determining the extent to which interna-
tional tribunal decisions have supremacy is whether or not do-
mestic judges have the power to enact this international law. Can 
the domestic judge overrule national law in the face of a conflict-
ing international decision? In some states, only the highest court 
of the land can overrule a law. For instance, the Italian court sys-
tem permits only the Italian Constitutional Court to address the 
constitutionality of national legislation. 85 Therefore, lower court 
" Neither the IGSID or UNCITRAL rules exj>licitly deny the J>anel the 
ability to proscribe a change in the law. However, the arbitrai.panels have not 
diverged from the issuance of monetary damages as an award. See, e:lk• Ameri· 
can Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ARB/93/1;Southem PacifiC Proper· 
ties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ARB/84/3). . 
84 See J.H.H; Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Ortfer-Througb the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1996) 
(commenting on the well-established supremacy doctrine of the ECJ and its 
limitations); see also Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and 
International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J.INT'LL. & PoL'Y (1995-96}. 
85 This system has only been modified regarding EU law, where it was held 
that if the lower Italian courts are not permitted to rule on the invalidity of an 
inconsistent statute, the integration of Community law in the Member States is 
significantly hindered,. For the progression of Community law in Italy, see 
Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585; Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato, 1978 
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judges are constrained by their national rules in the implementa-
tion of international rules. Similarly, in France and Great Britain, 
the tradition of judicial review did not exist and took more time 
to implement in light of EU law.86 For true supremacy of inter-
national law, all judges at all levels need the ability to evaluate na-
tional law in the face of conflicting international law. 
3.4. Transparency 
3.4.1. Why Transparency is Important 
Transparency in a dispute resolution system refers to the clar-
ity and intelligibility of the procedures of the system as well as to 
the outcomes. The level of transparency is important for a num-
ber of reasons, which could be called the three P's: publicity, 
precedent and predictability. First, when the rules and proce-
dures are clear, parties to the dispute are more likely to use the 
system. Government officials, as well as lawyers for individual 
clients, will have some comfort level with the dispute resolution 
system and will have an awareness of how the system works.87 
Second, published decisions of dispute resolution tribunals pro-
vide lessons and possible persuasive authority for other dispute 
resolution tribunals such as courts or arbitrations. If a decision is 
published, it can provide persuasive precedent for similar dis-
putes. 88 Publicity of decisions also puts pressure on states to 
E.C.R. 629 (holding that Italian National Court must give full effect to Com-
munity law provisions). See generally Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional 
Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European 
Community, 12M!CH. J. INT'LL. 173 (1990) (discussing contradictions between 
EU Court rulings and Italian )aw); Antonio La Pergola,Italy and European In· 
tegratwn: A Lawyer's Perspectwe, 4 IND. INT'L &; CoMP. L. REv. 259 (1994) 
(detailing growing support for EU integration in Italy and Italy's subsequent 
attempt to cope with EU directives which conflict witli their nat10nallaw). 
86 See, e.g., Mattli &; Slaughter, supra note 71, at 200-04 (1998). 
87 This concern with transparency and legitimacy has·also manifested itself 
in the EU. See Lole, supra note 15; Maher, supra note 15, 238-40; Weiler, su· 
pra note 3, at 2421 noting importance in the EU judicial system for citizens to 
act as a decentraliz agent for monitoring compliance). 
88 See, e.g., U~ted Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); 
North Seas Contmental Shelf (F.RG. v. Den.; F.RG. v. Netli.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20). For a further discuss10n on precedent in dispute resolution, see}OHN 
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND PoUCY OF IN. 
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1989); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, 
STRENGTHENING THE GATT DISPUTE SETILEMENT SYSTEM (1988); 
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comply with the rulings. 89 Finally, transparent rules and deci-
sions increase the predictability of the system. Clear rules set 
forth how the system is going to work and create confidence on 
the part of the users of the system. 90 The transparency of the sys-
tem provides the opportunity for both practitioners and academ-
ics to analyze, improve, and comprehend this particular interna-
tional dispute resolution system. Equally importantly, well-
reasoned decisions create confidence in the dispute resolution 
body and educate the users of the system about how the body 
would be likely to rule in the future. 
Even if a user of the system is not happy with the particular 
outcome, predictability allows the parties to decide whether or 
not to use this particular route of dispute resolution. When sys-
tems are not predicable, both government officials and private 
lawyers will be reluctant to advise governments and private actors 
to take a chance on a haphazard outcome. The clearest example 
of this has been ICSID, where the small number of cases over the 
years and the unpredictability in terms of appeals has led many 
government and corporate lawr;ers to advise their clients against 
this route of dispute resolution. 1 · . 
MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996); 
Yong K. Kim,. The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade Sys-
tem Despite U.S. Constitutiona!Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L 967 (1996). 
89 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPUANCE WITH lNTE!U'O\.TIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS 22 (1995). . . . 
· "' See Yair Baranes,. The Motivations and the Models: A Comparison of the Is-
rael-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 
N.Y.L. SCH. J- INT'L & COMP. L 145, 156 (1997) (arguing that the lack of 
specificity in the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is-problematic). 
91 T\>e ptoble~. with IC~ID is only partially a result of the lack of trans-
parency m the decisions. In Its 32 year hiStory, ICSID has only handled about 
45 cases. ICSID lacks the history and case load to _provide predictability and 
assurance to investors in need of an efficient and effective arbitration· facility. 
Another l'roblem with ICSID is that the decision is subject to review by an in-
ternal revtew-committee. Any_party may req_uest an interpretation, revision, or 
annnlmeilt ·of an award. ·See ICSID Convention § 5; arts. 50-52, supra note 61. 
The tribunal that rendered the award or, if unavailable or not practical, a new 
review tribunal shall decide on the reviewable issue. Revisions of an award mal' 
be l'rovided if new information is discovered within three years of the rendereil 
deciSions. See id., art. 51. Article 52 lists five reasonswhy an award may be an-
nulled: (1) the_ tribunal was not properly consti!uted, (2) the tribunaL mani-
festly exceeded Its powers, (3) a member of the tnbunal was corrupted, (4) the 
tribunal seriously departed from the fundamental rule of procedure, and (5) the 
award fails to state tlie reasons on which it was based. See id, art. 52. Although 
whether a decision is subject to review is not· a factor used to determine ihe 
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3. 4. 2. Lack of Rules and Procedure 
The lowest level of transparency is when the rules and proce-
dure do not exist in advance of the dispute .. Resolution is left up 
to the parties and no system is set forth. This is most typical in 
bilateral treaties, where disputes in compliance or intei'J'.retation 
of the treaty are left to the states to negotiate as they arise. 92 · 
3.4.3. Decisions/Agreements Not Published 
When the rules and procedures are clear but the decisions of 
the tribunal or the agreement between the parties are not pub-
lished, this creates an additional transparency issue. For example, 
an ICSID. arbitration decision can also be kept confidential if re-
quested by the parties. 93 This means that this decision cannot 
provide precedent or predictability in the system because unin-
volved lawyers cannot analyze the panel's thinking.94 In this case, 
type of dispute resolution .S}'stem, it clearly affects the overall effectiveness of 
any system. In addition to further time and expense associated with the deci-
sion, in ICSID's case, it further diminished the predictability o.f the dispute 
resolution system. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
TOWARD "JUDIC!AUZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? (Richard Lillich & Charles 
Brower eds.) (1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND 
REPAIR 46-106 (1992); Thomas L. Brewer,lntemational Investment Dispute Set· 
tlement Procedures: 1be Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW. 
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 633 (1995); David A. Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Ef 
fectiveAltemative to International Conflict, 19INT'LLAW 521 (1985). 
92 See example of the renegotiation of the U.S.·Japanese auto agreement 
discussed infra note 99. . 
93 Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention explicitly prohibits the publish· 
ing of awards without the consent of the parties. See ICSID Convention, supra 
note 61, art. 48(5). Thus, ~he transparency of such a system rem~s. question-
able. See John B. Attanasto, Rapporteur's Overvzew and Concluswns Of Saver· 
eignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL (1996) 
(aadressing the factors that make the ICSID less credible than ICJ judgments). 
See also J .A. Freed berg, The Role of tbe International Council for Commercial A r· 
bitration in Providing Source Material in International Commercial Arbitration, 
23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 272 (1995) (stating that even thoultit the ICSID Con· 
vention requires consent to publish, many awards get publislied). 
94 The ICSID's lack of case law precedent. as well as the review process 
make the arbitral facility less appealing to investors. Difficulty with. interfer· 
ence by national courts has made ICSID even more unreliable. See Maritime 
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Rel'ublic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (ICSID, Case No. ARB/84/ 4) (refusing to enforce the ICSrb arbitral 
awaid); Monroe Leigh,]udicial Deciswns, 81 AM. J.INT'LL. 206, 222-25 (1987). 
(detailffig AMCO Asia Corp. v. Republic of IndOnesia, 25 LL.M. 1439, ICSID 
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parties are able to understand how the system works, but are not 
confident using it. Outsiders either have no idea about the out-
come of the dispute, or, when they do, the lack of an explanation 
for the decision still leaves gaps in their understanding of how the 
tribunal works. In addition, a body of case law with persuasive 
force is not established, and the rules of the organization remain 
to be interpreted on an ad hoc basis. 
3.4.4. Decisions Are Published 
The highest level of transparency is when the decisions of the 
dispute resolution body are published regularly. In this case, the 
decisions can be read b§; practitioners, government officials, other 
jurists, and academics. 5 Decisions can b~ analyzed, explained, 
and used as a basis for other cases. Only in this way can persua-
sive authority be established. This is also the best way for private 
actors and their lawyers to become comfortable with the dispute 
resolution mechanism. Furthermore, public decisions increase 
the pressure on states to comply. This level of transparency cur-
rently exists only in the EU although the WTO has made prog-
ress towards this goal. 
3.5. Compliance/Enforcement 
The fifth and final factor in determining the value of individ-
ual involvement is the level of enforcement mechanisms provided 
for in the dispute resolution system. Compliance and enforce-
ment are often targeted as the main weakness of the international 
legal system. 96 Because international courts have thus far not had 
(Case No. ARB/81/1) (1986), where the Indonesian government annulled 
ICSID decision on the groundS that ICSID "manifestly exceeded its powers."). 
95 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Di!Pute Settlement System of the World 
Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT D~te Settlement System 
Since 1948, 31 COMMON.MK.T. L. REV. 1157, 1227 (1994) (explaining the neces-
sity of publishing decisions in a timely manner). 
96 John Austin, for example, called internationallaw"public international 
morality" at best because he defined law to reqnire the thieat of enforcement, 
while international law is merely enforced by moral obligation rather than di-
rect subjection to a nation's laws. See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or 
the Philosophv of Positive Law (New York, Jane Cockcroft & Co., 1875), vol. 1, 
p. 121; see afso LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN 
POliCY (2d ed. 1979) (discussin~the effects of international law on how nations 
behave among one another); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (4th ed. 1949) 
(discussing origins and peculiarities of international law). 
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military forces to enforce their decisions, many critics of the in-
ternational system focus on those cases where states choose to ig-
nore the international court. 97 The apparent uselessness of the 
United States bringing a case against Iran for holding U.S. hos-
tages and the attempt of the United States to avoid prosecution by 
Nicaragua are often cited as classic examples of what happens be-
fore an international court. Similarly, the breakdown of GATT 
in the 1980's as the most powerful states ignored GATT panel 
recommendations98 shows the weakness of relying on states to 
comply without effective enforcement measures. Without argu-
ing whether international dispute resolution can ever truly 
"work," it is important to assess the level of enforcement a court 
can have. 
3.5.1. No Formal Enforcement of the Treaty Rights 
The first level of enforcement of treaties is where there is 
nothing specific written into the treaty or dispute resolution sys-
tem. Enforcement under this system of dispute resolution is 
clearly left to the respective states. There is no oversight institu-
tion. Any noncompliance would put the parties back at the nego-
tiation table in order to work out this dispute as well. In other 
words, a negotiation system which relies on first-order compli-
97 Louis Henkin says • almost all nations observe almost all principles of in· 
ternational law and almost all of their obligations almost all of £he time." 
HENKIN, supra note 96, at 47. But, skeptics point to plenty of contrary evi-
dence such as the Iran-United States or United States-Nicaragua cases before the 
ICJ. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran) 
1981 I.C.J. 45 (May 12); Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nic. v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.~. 14 Gune 27). 
8 GATT procedure provided the losing parties with successful means of 
delaying the appointments of panels, effectively blocking adoption of the panel 
reports, and merely ignoring l'anel decisions. For instance, after the U.S. as-
serted a complaint in 1981 unoer GATT against the EC concerning pasta ex-
port subsidies, the EC effectively blocked adoption of the panel report in favor 
of the United States. The United States resorted to indirect retahation efforts 
which sparked countermeasures by the EC. See ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 151-54 (1993) (citing Subsidies on Exports of 
Pasta Products, SCM/43, May 19, 1983, an unadopted decision, and other cases 
detailing GATT's ineffectiveness); see also Petersmann, supra note 95, at 1203.04 
(enumerating some further problem areas of the GATT dispute settlement sys-
tem). 
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ance requires following the agreement at all times. States either 
follow the agreement, or they must negotiate a new one.99 
3.5.2. Second.Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring the 
Treaty 
Second-order compliance occurs when a dispute resolution 
mechanism exists under the treaty which would rule on compli-
ance. by the member states. Without a separate mechanism, rules 
for treaty compliance and breach follow the default rules of the 
Vieima Convention. 100 The rules of the Vienna Convention, 
however, are generally gerceived as insufficient in terms of deal-
ing with treaty breach,' 1 and therefore create an incentive for in-
" For example, Japan and the U.S. have had to renegotiate their agreement 
on the au_ to parts market several times. See U.S. Frustratea by Japan's Progress on 
C.r Sales, Dealerships in Auto Talks, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1759 (Oct. 9, 
1997); High Level Talks Slated with Japan onAuto Agreement, supra note 56; 
Dav1d Sanger, Trade's Bottom Lone: Busmess over PolitiCs, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
1995, at D5. 100 See Vienr.a Convention on the Laws of Treaties, opened for signat~re 
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Con£. 39/27 [hereinafter V1enna Convention]. 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention specificallr address issues of treaty 
interpretation. According to Article 31f a treaty shal be interpreted first by 
looking at the text of the treaty itself in ight of the object and pu'l'ose. Meth-
ods for interpretation shall then recognize the entire treaty taking mto consid-
eration subsequent treaties and practices. The negotiation history of the treaty 
will also be taken into consideration. If the treaty remains ambiguous after 
those considerations, Article 32 allows for recognition of the preparatory 
works for the final method of interpretation. Subsequent articles deal with the 
conditions under which a party may terminate its oliligations under the treaty. 
For instance, Article 46 inValidates a treaty if it violates an international law of 
fundamental principle; Articles 49 through 52 deal with the termination of ob-
ligations when a treaty was jlrocured tlirough fraud1 corruption, or coercion; Article 61 discharges a party for impossibilitf of pertormance; and, Article 62, 
rebus sic stantibUs,-· allows for termmation o a treaty in which a circumstance 
that was an essential basis for consent fundamentally changes to the extent of 
radically transforming the scope of obligation. As a last resort, a !'artY to a 
treaty may. terminate its obligation by breach but must confront the conse-
quences addressed by Article 60. 101 See Frede~ic Kirg_is, Jr., Some Lin~;ering Questions about Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treatzes, 22, CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 549 (1989) 
(discussing the unresolved issues of breach); John K. Setear,Responses to Breach 
of a Treaty and Rationalist International Refations Theory: The Rules of Release 
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsihilit:y, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (explaining that, in addition to Article 60, remedies for 
breach of a treaty exist m the form of an uncodified law}; see also SHABTAI 
ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY (1985) (generalizing breaches of treaties). Arti-
cle 60 of the Vienna Convention delineates the consequences for breach of a 
treaty. In the instance of a material breach involving a bilateral treaty, the ter-
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ternational organizations to set up more complete mechanisms of 
dispute resolution. . 
Any of the formal mechanisms discussed here-including arbi-
tration under ICSID, panels under GATT, the dispute resolution 
system under the WTO, and cases under the ECJ-act as second-
order compliance mechanisms. They permit cases to be brought 
for noncompliance with the treaty rules. Both GATT and the 
ICJ are examples of court systems that provide for little realistic 
r · b d · · f h · · al · 102 emorcement eyon censure o t e mternatlon comtnumty. 
These systems stop at second-order compliance, whereby states 
should obey the law, but if they violate the law, they should pay a 
fine (or change the law). 
One important factor to note at this stage is how and when 
cases are brought to the dispute resolution system. For example, 
in the EU, the Commission acts as an oversight body and can 
mination or suspension of obligations may be instituted by the nonbreaching 
party. With a multilateral treaty, all nonbreaching parties must consent to the 
termination or suspension of tlie treaty in whole or in part. Specifically, the 
affected !'artY may suspend its obligatwns with the breaching party, or if the 
material breach radically changes the scope of the treaty any nonbreaching 
P.artY may inyoke suspension or termination .of the treaty. See Vienna Conven-
uon, supra note 100, art. 60. . . _ 
• 
102 
·Although GATT provided for retaliation and the ICJ provides for en· 
forcement under the Security Council, neither of these remedies were real pos-
sibilities for enforcement. The Security Council has never ajl~horiied militaty 
actio·n nor economic sanctions for noncompliance with .an I CT. decision. See 
Mark Janis, Somber Reflections on the c_ ompulsory Jurisdiction of th_ elnternational 
Court, in Af'!',aisals of the IC]~ Decision: Nicaragua v .. United States (Merits}, 81 
AM. J. !NT L L. 144, 145 n.l6-17 (Harold G. Maier ed., 1987) (statmg that al-
. though the U.N. Charter authorizes the Securi!')' Council to enforce oecisions 
of the ICJ, no action has ever been taken). Retaltation authoriZed under GATT 
was only used once by the Netherlands against the United States. See ROBERT 
E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 198 
(1990). However, the enforcement of decisions in international law through 
voluntaty compliance in the face of international pressure should not be under- ·. 
estimated. Many countries regularly abide by unfavorable rulings in order to 
· remain a law abtding member of the international community. See CHA YES & 
CHAYES, supra note 89, at 28. Furthermore, direct foreign atd, foreign invest-
ment, and World Bank projects are often linked to compliance under interna· 
· tionallaw. For exrunple, the World Bank bas played a major role in the com-
pliance of environmental laws in Mexico. See Mexico's Environmental 
Controls for New Companies, 2 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 15 (1992); David Bar-
rans, Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt 
. Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL !NT'L L.J. 65 (1991). But sei: Stephanie 
Guyett, Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and DeveloJl!nent, 24 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 
889 (1992) (criticiZing the shortcomings of such an enforcement mechanism). 
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bring cases of noncompliance to the ECJ.103 Other organizations 
do not provide standing for any oversight body, meaning that 
cases will be brought, if at all, by other states. Under GATT, 
states could also delay or avoid a case.104 Under the new WTO 
procedures, the dispute resolution system has become much more 
. di "al" d !OS JU Cl 1ze • 
3.5.3. Third-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring 
Decisions · 
Third-order compliance can be demonstrated by way of a traf-
fic law example. If we conceive that following the traffic laws is 
first-order compliance and paying the traffic ticket when one does 
not it is second-order comrliance, an arrest warrant or contempt 
citation for nonpayment o the traffic ticket would be third-order 
compliance. This is yet another level of forcing one to comply 
with the original laws set forth. In the international arena, the 
analogy would be following the trade treaty as complying in the 
first-order, and agreeing to change the tariff in response to a de-
termination that the tariff was unfair would be the second-order 
103 Article 169 of the EEC Treaty gives the Commission the authority to 
enforce community law compliance for all Member States. The Commission 
will first give the State notice in the form of an opinion letter, detailing the 
method and timeliness ofcompliance. If the Member State refuses to comply, 
the Commission can st.ie the Member State in the ECJ. See Case 7/61, Com· 
mission v. Italy, 1961 E.C.R. 317 (forcing Italy to terminate its ban on imported 
pork in compliance with community law). See Karen Banks, National Enforce· 
ment of Community Rights, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 669 (1984}. Article 170 
gives a Member State the right to sue another Member State for the enforce-
ment of community law. The complaining State must first submit its concern 
with the Commission and allow the Commission to enforce the issue. See Case 
232/78, Commission v. France, 1979 E.C.R. 2729 (describing Commission ac· 
tion on complaints from the United Kingdom). Although a rare occurrence, if 
specific measures are not taken the complainmg State can take the infringing 
State directly to the ECJ. See, e.g., Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom, 
1979 E.C.R. 2923. For more on enforcement of these articles, see generallyEn· 
forcementActiom under Articles 169and 170 EEC, 14 EUR. L. REv. 388 (1989). 
104 See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
209, 236-37 {1997) (discussing the delays brought about by die United States 
when Brazil pursued under GATT complaints about Section 301}; see also John 
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC C.Se in GATT, 72 
AM. J. lNT'L L., 747,.779-81 (1978} (concluding that the some GATT dispute 
cases, due to interference from other states, severely injure GATT's prestige). 
105 See Petersmann, supra note 95; Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The 
judicialization of International Trade Relations, 17Nw. J. lNT'LL. & Bus. 775 
(1996-97). 
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of compliance. The third-order of compliance would be a system 
by which the affected state, private actor or even the international 
organization would be able to bring noncompliance with the in-
ternational decision back to the dispute resolution system. 
In some situations, this third-order compliance mechanism is 
available. For example, if an international arbitration body 
awards a certain amount of money to a party that is then not 
paid, many states now provide that the winner of the arbitral 
award can bring a case in domestic court to enforce the judg-
ment.106 Another example is the EU, which provides that a state 
or the Commission can bring a case to the ECJ a~Wnst a member 
state that has not complied with a court decision. 7 Enforcement 
under the EU is even more likely because the decisions themselves 
are integrated into the domestic legal fabric as is done with the re-
ferral system under the ECJ.108 Because the ECJ makes the ruling 
106
. Signatories of the New York Convention permit individuals and na· 
tions access to their courts in order to attach assets of nonpaying parties to an 
arbitration. See Convention of the United NationS on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreij;n Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30 
U.N.T.S. 38. [heremafter New York Convention]; Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier ("RAKTA "), 508 
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (enforcing an award on the basis of the New York 
Convention). Article V of the New York Convention recognizes only seven 
circumstances in which a signatory state may refuse enforcement and, thus, this 
treaty has been credited wtth drastically strenj;thening the apl'eal of interna-
tional arbitration. See Susan Choi,judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards 
Under ICSID and the New York Convention, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 175 
(1995); Eric Green, International Commercial ?ilute Resolution, 15 B.U. lNT'L 
LJ. 175,177 (1997); Elise P. Wheeless, Article Vi'i) (!3) of the New York Conven· 
tion, 7 EMORY lNT'L L. REV. 805 (1993). In a cfiuon to the New York Con-
vention other treaties exist for the purpose of enforcement of arbitral awards 
such as the Panama Convention, die Washington Convention, and the Euro-
pean Convention. See Inter~American Convention on International Commer-
cial Arbitration of 1975, entered into force June 16, 1976, 14 I.L.M. 336; Wash-
ington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
ana Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 532; European Commu-
nities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229. • 
107 See, e·l:·• Case 169/87, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 4093 (forcing 
the Commisswn to bring France in front of the ECJ for the second ume for 
noncompliance with an earlier court rnling on tobacco pricing}; Case 48/71, 
Commission v. Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527 (allowing a claim against Italian govern-
ment for failure to levy an EU tax}; Case 131784, Commission v. Italy 1985 
E.C.R. 3531 (allowing action against Italy for failure to enforce the"Collective 
Redundancies"); Case 69/86, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 773 (enforcing a 
previous judgnient against Italy for the quality control of produce). 
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on the law alone, the domestic court then renders the final deci-
sion applying the EU law to the facts at hand. Since the decision 
is from a domestic court, not an international court, many com-
mentators believe that states are far less likely to ignore the deci-
sions.109 Each additional .order of compliance means that private 
actors have increased ability to force states to comply with the 
treaty. 
3.5.4. Punishment 
A final component of enforcement is the type of punishment 
permitted under the treaty and dispute resolution system. Re-
taliation apart from an international treaty is generally seen as a 
violation of internationallaw.110 Treaty-approved retaliation, on 
the other hand, can provide an effective enforcement mechanism. 
This approved ret,Uiation does .not constitute a breach or termina-
tion of the treaty but rather an appropriate means of punishment 
for the treaty violation. The retaliation can be carried out by the 
state against which the harm has been committed or even by 
other states. · 
For example, the WTO outlines ·stringent enforcement meas-
. f 'd' f £ . 111 ures m terms o prov1 mg a menu o enrorcement optwns. 
108 F ._, . h' A . 9 d or more 1morm~t1on on t 1S _process see ttanasto, supra note 3, an 
Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court of the EU in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'LL. & POL. 275 {1996). . 
109 See generally Symposium, supra note 84, {portraying several views COJ;l-
cerning the problems ana inconsistencies between nattonru and international 
bodies). 
110 See }AGDISH BHAGWATI ET AL., AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAUSM {1990) 
{describing various opinions on the debate over U.S. trade sanctions and the 
GATT.); see also Clay Hawes, The Pe/ly Amendment Sanctions, 3 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 97 {1994) (debating whether sanctions imposed on Norwegian 
~oods for violation of the Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994) 
tS a violation of internationa! law); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Fu· 
ture of Section 301, 34 COLUM. J. TRANS. NAT'LL. 173 {1995) (eva!uating sane· 
tions in the area of intellectua! property); Lopez,supra note 65 (discussing the 
controversy of the Helms-Burton Act as a potentia! violation of NAFT A). 
111 Under the WTO, if a party does not comply with a decision within the 
specified time period, the party must start negotiations for mutua!ly accepted 
compensation .. If no compensation is agreed upon aher twenty days, the com· 
plainant, un~er ~ide 22, ?" request authonz~tion from the Dispu~e Settle-
·ment Body { DSB ) to retit11ate. The DSB cons1sts of one rel?resentat1ve from 
each member of the agreement in dispute and has the authonty to administer 
rules and procedures, ado.Pt reports from panels, maintain surveillance of im· 
plementattOn, and authonze suspension of concessions. Unless there is a con· 
sensus against reta!iation, the DSB must grant authorization within 30 days. 
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First, a state has the opportunity to follow the ruling and, usually, 
change the offending practice. Second, the state can continue the 
practice and pay damages to the harmed state.112 If neither of 
these options are taken, the harmed state can retaliate. 113 The 
WTO provides that the harmed state must first retaliate in the 
same sector of trade. However, if this is not seen as effective, the 
WTO permits cross-sector retaliation.114 This newer form of the 
international adjudication has more teeth then its predecessors 
and attempts to correct some of the problems of the past.115 
Retaliation will ftrst be taken in the same sector as the violation. If, however, 
such retaliation is not _practical or effective, action will be taken in another sec-
tor in the same general area. If this still proves ineffective or impractical, action 
will be taken as a suspension of benefits u11der the related Uruguay Round 
Agreement. The determination as to whether· retalicition ·is practical or effective 
will be made by the complaining party rather than the WTO panel or the de-
fending party. See Thomas J. Dillion, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A 
New Legal Order for World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing 
the effectiveness of the WTO with a comparison of the lack of enforcement 
under compliance mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or 
the World Bank}; Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settle· 
ment Report: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance, 11 
ST.JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 307 (1996). 
112 Under Article 21 of theDispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), if 
the party does not, within thirty days, state intentions for implementing rec- S 
ommendations of the adopted panel report and set a time penod for compli-
ance, the parties must commence negotiations for mutual!)' accepted compensa-
tion. See, e.g., John Maggs, US May Buck· Tide, Take on ihe WTO, J. COM. 1 
(1998) (detailing that in the face of a recent WTO preliminary report that the 
U.S. emban:o on shrimp imports, designed to protect sea turtles, was illegal, 
speculation has begun that the United States woUld prefer to pay compensation 
or accept sanctions rather than change the law). 
Ill Article 22 of the DSU allows the complaining party to request authori-
zation from the DSB to retaliate. The DSB must grant authorization within 
thirtf. days unless there is a consensus against such retaliation. 
· 
1 4 Article 22 of the DSU permits cross-sector retaliation if the previous 
retaliation, within the sector, is not deemed practical or effective. The deter-
mination of whether retaliation is "practical" or "effective" will be made by the 
complaini~~g party, rather than the DSU. However, paragraph four limits the 
retaltation a government can impose to the equivalent of benefits that the de-
fending country was impairing. See also 19U.S.C. § 241l(a)(3) (1994) (imposing 
the same limitations). . 
·· 
115 See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana 
Charter to the World Trade Ori!.anization, 34 GOLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 
{1995); Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GA TT!WTO Decision Making, 
17 Nw·}· lNT'L L. & Bus. 653 (1997); Patrick Moore, The Decisions Bringing the 
GATT 947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AM. J. lNT'L L. 317 (1996); Curtis 
Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. 
lNT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996). 
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Another type of enforcement is a fine levied against the mem-
ber state for a violation of the treaty. This fine could be paid to 
the international organization, the affected state or the private ac-
tor who is directly harmed. Under traditional international law, 
once a state took up a private actor's claim of harm, the money to 
be paid would go to the state.116 A more recent innovation in in-
ternational law is the idea that states can be directly liable to indi-
viduals for the harm they have suffered. This is the case under 
EU!aw. 
This type of punishment directly rectifies the harm caused by 
the noncompliance with the international law and also puts a 
price tag on noncompliance. The ECJ acts like a domestic court 
since it awards damages directly to aggrieved private actors.117 
The power to award damages may alter a national government's 
decision whether to comply with an international law since it 
puts a price tag on noncompliance. The costs of noncompliance 
can be severe and direct. 118 The EU has gone even further since 
116 See RICHARD B. Lll.UCH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL 
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 45 (1975). The prob-
lem arising with enforcing claims in this manner is a concern of timeliness. The 
claims are only settled years after the harm was done and, thus, the settlement 
is often not an effective resolution. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-
Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 434, 436, 440 
n.15 (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of settlements in the 1980's between 
the U.S. and China forless than 40% ofthe claim and in 1992 between the U.S. 
and Germany for around 6% of the claim). 
117 See Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
1984 E.C.R. 1891 (allowing individual workers to enforce their rights under a 
Community Directive on equal employment); Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz 
eG v. Landwirtschafts-Kammer Fiir Das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989 (forcing 
Germany officials to refund illegal money charged to individuals for the inspec-
tion of imported apples even tliough the German statute of frauds had run on 
the claim). For more on this aspect of the ECJ's damages awards see David 
O'Keefe, supra note 48, and April Phillippa Tasli,Remedies for European Com-
munity Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a European Standard, 31 
COLVM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 377 (1993). 
118 See Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and S.-W. Hampshire 
Area Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. I-4367 (imposing damages that exceeded the 
United Kingdom's statutory limitations); Case G6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. 
Italy1 [1993]2 CM.L.R. 66 (1993) (Italy) (forcing Italy to compensate workers for aamages suffered by nommplementation of a community directive dealing 
with worker's protectiOn against bankrupt employers); Case 70/72 Commis-
sion v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R. 813 (forcing Germany to not only cease the ille-
gal payments of state aid, but also, recover any aid already granted to its nation-
31s). Remarkably, the ECJ has not imposed any fine thus far in a case brought 
by the Commission. Article 171 specifiCally states that the ECJ may, by there-
quest of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payments upon a 
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1991 and found that member states can be liable to private actors 
for damages suffered through the nonimplementation of EU 
laws.119 And, in some ways, these fines make compliance in the 
first place easier since a government can demonstrate how non-
compliance will directly hurt the national treasury. A potentially 
large damage award helps the governments protect themselves 
against strong domestic lobbies as well. 
These damage remedies in the EU are additional to a require-
ment to change the law, unlike in the WTO system which grants 
choice. By replacing the traditional international law remedy of 
retaliation, a damages system is closer to a domestic court system. 
Violations of international law are treated like any other violation 
of the law. By eliminating retaliation, the EU avoids escalation 
between states retaliating and cross-retaliating. It also avoids link-
age between different trade issues; each problem is treated sepa-
rately and judged on its own merits. An enforcement system 
with damages to private actors clearly protects private actors the 
most of the trade systems established. 
4. INCREASING INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION INCREASES 
DEMOCRACY 
The purpose of this Article has been to outline the factors that 
measure individual participation in dispute resolution and com-
Member State that refuses compliance. This Article was added to the Treaty at 
the request of Parliament concerned with the enforcement of Community law. 
Article 171(1), stating that necessaty measures shall be taken for enforcement of 
compliance, has been used by the ECJ. See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The 
Enforcement ofEU Law, 18 Hous. J. !NT'LL. 833, 898 n.207 (1996) ~isting the 
fifteen cases in violation of Article 171). However, the imposition of a fine, 
under Article 171(2), has yet to be employed. See Kennetli M. Lord, Note, 
BootstTaPfJing an Environmental Policy from an Economic Convent, 29 CORNELL 
!NT'L LJ. 571, 606 n.325 (1996) (commenting on the lack of enforcement 
through use of fines). See also Michael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor 
Rights in North America1 30 STAN. J. !NT'L L. 579, 596 n.81 (1994) (reasoning 
the lack of enforcement by use of Article 171). . 
119 In 1991, the ECJ instituted remarkable advancement for the enforce-
ment of Community law through the preliminaty reference ruling in Fran-
covicb v. Italy. See Joined Cases 6/90 & 9/90, Francovich, [1990]1 C.M.L.R. 
66 (1990); Rene Valladares, Francovicb: Lir,ht at the End of the Marsliall Tunnel, 3 
U. MIAMi Y.B. !NT'L L. 1 (1;995). The ruline conferred hability UJ?On a Member 
State to an individual for damages incurred by nonimplementauon of a direc-
tive. Thus, because Italy failed to implement a directive concerning the cover-
age of employees under insolvent employers, Italy was liable for the damages 
the employees suffered. See Valladares, supra. 
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pare them to the dispute resolution models currently used in in-
ternational trade organizations. By doing so, we can understand 
how each of these factors either adds or detracts from the legiti-
macy of international trade organizations. In the end, we can 
recognize that individual participation has the ability to increase 
democracy in several significant ways. 
4.1. judicial Decisionmaking is Lawmaking 
The first step in recognizing the importance of individual par-
ticipation is to recognize the importance itself of dispute resolu-
tion. Historically, states handled trade disputes through negotia-
tion and little attention was given to other methods for resolving 
them. Only with the evolution of the EU, and the regional hu-
man rights systems, has appro~riate focus been given to the im-
portance of dispute resolution. 0 . 
. In focusing on dispute resolution, we are recognizing the evo-
lution of trade organizations that do more than rdy on states to 
resolve their disputes. The creation of the Dispute Resolution 
Body under the WTO and the NAFTA system evolving from the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement clearly demonstrate that fo-
cus on dispute resolution is warranted. As trade organizations 
continue to evolve, it will be their dispute resolution systems that 
herald this evolution. 
The result of dispute resolution mechanisms is that each of the 
organizations· will be creating a body of law in addition to the 
original agreement. This body of law may have.varying levels of 
precedence and supremacy but will be the area in which these or-
ganizations could primarily evolve. Therefore, it is crucial that 
we also focus on ways to ensure this stage of lawmaking is demo-
cratic and legitimate. 
Even when national governments determine that trade policy 
and agreements should be negotiated in secret or soldy by the ex-
ecutive. branch, once the agreement is reached this original deci-
sion should not preclude citizen involvement in the enforcement 
120 - . Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Govern· 
ments and the European Court of justice, 52 lNT'L ORG. 121 (1998); Geoffrey 
Garrett, The Politics of Lew!! Integration in the EU, 49 INT'L ORG. 171 (1995); 
Geoffrey Garrett et a!., 1'IJe Eurp~n Court of Justice, National Governments, 
and Lef!f'l Integration in the EU, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998); Walter Mattli and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the EU: A Reply to Garrett Union, 49 
INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating_ the Single European Act, 
45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991); Weiler, The Transformation ojEurope, supra note 3. 
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stage. Legislating original law and resolving disputes about that 
law are two separate functions. As I noted earlier, the debate over 
the "democracy deficit" in the EU focuses on the first function. 
We should also look to the second function and recognize the im-
portance of dispute resolution. 
4.2. Individual Involvement Promotes Legitimacy 
There are several specific ways in which granting standing to 
private actors can remedy typical conflicts in a national govern-
ment. First, giving private actors the right to bring cases, rather 
than requiring them to lobby or petition the government to take 
actio~2tliminates ~he problem of captl~r~ at th_e dispute resolution 
stage. Otherwise, only states participate m the process and, 
therefore, rely on political pressures to' determine whether to pur-
sue violations of trade agreements. Understandably, a state will 
not choose to spend its limited attention and energy on trade 
problems which have little impact on the domestic economy. 
States will weigh the impact on certain industries, the political 
clout of those industries, and pressures from other domestic con-
stituencies before embarking on negotiations. A state may not 
even know of any violation until a domestic interest alerts them. 
For example, if a company in the US feels that another state is 
violating the GATT rules, it must petition the USTR under the 
301 procedure in order to pursue a judicial remedy. The USTR 
must then make a decision as to whether it is worth the time and 
energy to pursue a remedy through the ·WTO. This procedure 
probably operates,very well for the "Kodaks" and "ffiMs" of the 
world, but if the company affected by the violations is relatively 
small, lacks political influence or power, or has not suffered large 
losses, the USTR could, legitimately, conclude that out of the 
· 
121 Of course, there is always the issue of adjudicatory capture in which in-
terest gr'!ups are able to use the judicial syste':l' for their own interests .. One 
example m the context of trade dispute resolution could be the EU where pub-
lic interest groups in Great Britam have used the EU in order to advance 
changes in the domestic law. See Catherine Barnard, A European Litigation 
Strategy: 7be O.Se of the Equal Opportunities Commission, in NEW LEGAL 
DYNAMICS OF EU 253 ijo Shaw &"IJillian More eds, 1995); see also Mattli & 
Slaughter, supra note 71, at 185-190 (1998). Another example could be if envi-
ronmental NGO's use NAFTA to force Mexico to comply with its own envi-
ronmental laws. See Atik, supra note 26. · 
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numerous trade violations it polices, this particular violation is 
not worth the government's limited resources. 
A government may also choose not to bring a case because it 
does not want the violation addressed. A state could decide not to 
bring a case against a particular state for political reasons in deal-
ing with that state or because other domestic interests would pre-
fer to keep the law unchanged. Furthermore, intergovernmental 
pressure may result in cases not being brought to the international 
adjudicatory body. The best example of this is the controversy 
over the Helms-Burton law, which restricts trade with Cuba and 
punishes those who engage in such trade.122 The EU initially 
lodged a complaint with the WTO, which has repeatedly post-
poned the issue to allow the EU and the United States time to ne-
gotiate. There is no doubt that domestic pressure in the United 
States has led to the United States placing pressure on the EU not 
to pursue the case. In this way, the WTO has become politicized. 
Rather than aajudicating appropriate restrictions on trade, the fo-
rum is hijacked by the domestic pressure and politics of U.S. pol-
icy towards Cuba. If there were private actor standing in the 
WTO, this case would already be in the process of being heard. 
Furthermore, giving private actors standing may be the best 
method of ensuring that their own state actually follows the trade 
agreement.123 For example, under the current system, it is un-
likely that the United States or any other state would agree to 
bring a case against itself in the WTO. One only has to examine 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ to recognize that the right to bring 
cases in the EU has resulted, as often as not, in private actors su-
ing their own government for violations of EU law.124 This en-
sures that a commitment to trade liberalization is not later over-
ridden by specific exceptions or changes to the law agreed to by 
122 For an explanation of.the Helms·B)!rton Act, its domestic and interna-
tional effect, and foreign responses, see Symposium, 20 The Helms-Burton Act: 
Domestic Initiatives ana Foreign Responses, HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
713-814 (1997). . 
123 See Robert Cover, The Uses of jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideol· 
ogy, and Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE EssAYS 
OF ROBERT COVER 51-93 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that juris-
dictional redundancy, as ex!Sts between the federal and state ~stem in the U.S. 
and also between die domestic systems and the EU, can effectively deal with 
the problems of the elite in a J?Olitical system and is an appropriate method of 
dealmg with conflicting values 1n a society.) 
"'sdi · · ee scusswn supra sectwn 3.2.4. 
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!awmakeffs under pressure from powerful and narrow lobbying 
mterests. 
In addition, individual involvement will also lead to increased 
transparency and use of the dispute resolution system. Transpar-
ency of procedures and decisions is a crucial part of building the 
legitimacy of any organization. As private actors use the system 
and become comfortable with the rules, it will build momentum 
and its use will increase. This promotes understanding and, in the 
end, confirms the legitimacy of the organization and its proce-
dures. 
Finally, examining the role of private actors in dispute resolu-
tion is consistent with a liberal IR approach. The level of indi-
vidual participation can vary with each of factors examined in 
Section 3. This level of participation clearly affects how govern-
ments order their preferences and which segments of society are 
most represented in dispute resolution. Increased individual in-
volvement would certainly broaden the spectrum of society so-
represented, and perhaps affect government preferences to act 
more legitimately in its own decisionmaking. 
4.3. Individual Participation Will Increase the Effectiveness of 
International Organizations 
Granting private actors standing will also promote the effec-
tiveness of the underlying trade agreement. Private actors can 
make the determination when a violation is of sufficient harm to 
bring a case. We neither rely on states policing one another, with 
all of the attendant political concerns, nor rely on an oversight 
body, which may have political concerns and limited resources or 
research capabilities. Better policing of a trade agreement will oc-
cur if enforcement relies on those who are most invested with 
protecting their rights and benefits under the trade agreement.126 
The result of better policing is twofold. First, more enforce-
ment actions will be brought, and second, these actions will be 
narrowly tailored to deal directly with the particular law causing 
harm. In the area of trade law, this direct involvement makes 
sense. The trade agreements are designed to influence private ac-
125 See Atik, supra note 26. 
126 See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free 
Trade Area: The Importance of the Domestic Legal !ietting 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 329, 
332-333 (1987). . 
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tor behavior based on state promises. The state promises to lower 
tariffs, or eliminate barriers, or reduce taxation. In exchange, 
companies invest, start businesses, or increase trade. When those 
state promises are broken-laws are not changed or new barriers 
are erected-it is private actors who suffer the consequences. As is 
the case with human rights, individuals should have some re-
course.127 We have already recognized this in the area of labor 
rights under the lnternati9nal Labor Organization ("ILO") and 
even under the WTO for intellectual property rights. 128 Under 
the ILO, workers' organizations can bring noncompliance cases 
in the area of human rights and labor rights against a state.129 
Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights ("TRIPS"), private actors will be able to bring cases in do-
mestic courts for noncompliance. 130 It is somewhat anachronistic 
and curious that trade rights should be moving in the other direc-
tion. 
127 PETERSMANN, supra note 10, at 8 ("Political theory, and historical expe-
rience (e.z. in the context of EC law and of the European Convention on Hu· 
111an Rights) confir111 that granting actionable rights to self-interested citizens 
offers tlie most effective incentives for self-enforcing liberal constitution."). 
128 See id. at 33 & 62 (1997); 
129 The International Labor Organization ("ILO") utilizes a tripartite sys· 
tern divided into government, employment1 and labor to promote the global 
recognition of human and labor rights. The Governing Body consists of 28 
government members, 14 employer members, and 14 worker members. Com· 
mittees and delegations for annual conferences are similarly structured. The 
ILO is unique in allowing organizations of employers or workers to allege non· 
compliance comp.Jaints. azainst the contracting states. Although. private indi· 
vidua!s are not allowed direct access without the backing of an established or-
ganization, the democratic proceSs is. strengthened by the employers' arid 
workers' involvement. See Petersmann, ·supra· note 10, at 433-34 (cOmmenting 
that the increase of private individual participation "reflect[s] the democratic 
functions of internattonalliberal rules and organizations for the participation of 
individual rights"). See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEIDE LA CRUZ ET AL., 
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1996) (providing overview of 
the ILO procedures). . · 
130 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or· 
ganization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE UR.UGUAY 
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS. Agreement] . The 
TRIPS Agreement recognizes that mtelfectual property rights are private rights. 
Although implementatton is at the discretion of the members, the agreement 
encourages recognition of private party participation . 
• 
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4.4. Responding to the Democracy Deficit 
Of the existing models of dispute resolution, clearly the EU 
provides for the most individual involvement. ~ndividuals are di-
rectly granted rights and the standing to protect those rights. 
Court decisions are supreme to national law and, can be inte-
grated directly into the domestic legal fabric. The procedures and 
rulings are transparent and highly accessible to private actors. Fi-
nally, enforcement through the domestic legal system gives the 
best chance that the judgments of the supranational court will be 
followed. While no model of dispute resolution can be com-
pletely de-politicized, the EU best tries to ensure that member 
states comply with international trade law without allowing them 
to make short-term, narrow decisions about compliance. 
In comparison, other trade orgartizations fall short. Invest-
ment arbitration under ICSID or UNICTRAL does provide for 
limited democracy. It has the advantages of allowing investors to 
bring cases against states when their rights have been violated. 
Furthermore, increased enforcement of arbitration awards makes 
it likely that states will comply and pay the damages awarded. 
The problem with this type of model, however, is the limited 
scope of the arbitration action. First, the rights provided in 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA or in bilateral investment treaties are the 
most basic of free trade rights. States can protect, and have pro-
tected, their most sensitive national issues and· industries in the 
agreement in the first place.131 Second,. an arbitration decision 
does not change the law of the offending state and any settlement 
can also be kept private if the parties so wish. In this way, a state 
can choose to pay in order to continue to .break the law. Third, 
since this is a single arbitration case, rather than an authoritative 
court decision, a state can deal with this one instance quietly 
without creating the problem of numerous cases brought on the 
same issue. Although arbitration reduces the likelihood of cap-
ture somewhat in terms of the choice as to when to bring a case, 
the scope of the rights and the decision are severely limited. 
The WTO model also provides only Partial answers to the 
questions of political capture and institutional effectiveness. The 
new procedures and enforcement capabilities of the WTO are de-
• 
. 
131 See NAFTA, supra note 65, arts. 1120, 1138, annexes 1120.1, 1138.2, chs. 
21, 32 (noting several exceptions). · 
• 
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signed to reduce dramatically the link between trade and domestic 
political interests. Once a dispute is brought to the WTO, a state 
will have much less ability to avoid complying with the law. The 
fault of the WTO, and other systems that rely on states to bring 
cases, is that the lack of rights and the lack of standing for private 
actors make the system less responsive to the citizenry and less 
democratic in the end. Under the WTO, private actors must rely 
on their governments to assert and defend their trading rights. 
It is ironic that the EU has been the focus of the democracy 
deficit debate. While I do not dispute the validity of argument in 
reference to the legislative process in the EU, we need to recog-
nize that the EU's accomplishments in providing for democracy 
in its dispute resolution are unique. 
4. 5. Objections to Individual Participation 
There are numerous objections to the increased participation 
of private actors in international trade organizations. I will focus 
on three of them. 
4.5.1. States Will Not join International Organizations 
The first objection could well be that states will be more re-
luctant to join organizations that give their citizens such power. 
Involving private actors means that the government has less con-
trol over dispute resolution and, ultimately, the legal interpreta-
tion of the treaty. 132 This distribution of power to the citizens 
rather than the government can be threatening to states risky for 
them. 
This objection has been raised most frequently in the case of 
human rights organizations. where states are reluctant to either 
join the organization or are reluctant to sign the additional proto-
col which would permit cases being brought by their citizens.133 
Therefore, the argument goes, states will not join trade agree-
132 This objection has also been used in the application of extraterritorial 
securities laws, where the argument has been made that the existence of private 
!'laintiffs improperly moves the locus of foreign policy decisionmaking from 
the executive branch to the judicial branch. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterrita-
rialit:y in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire CAse, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 
289, 320-21. 
m For examl'le, of the 140 countries who are parties to the ICCPR only ·93 
have ratified the Optional Protocol. See ICCPR, supra note 32; Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 . 
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ments if their citizens can enforce it against them. However, this 
objection overlooks the key difference between these types of 
agreements. Other governments create human rights treaties for 
the purpose of protecting citizens from the actions of their own 
government.134 (Aliens have long had the right under interna-
tional law to be protected from abuse and their home state has 
long had the right to demand reparation for their harm.) One 
mechanism created to protect these individual rights under hu-
man rights treaties is to allow the individual to sue his or her own 
government for violation of their rights under the international 
treaty. 
International trade treaties, however, are completely different 
in their purpose and in the benefits accruing to each state. While 
human rights treaties could be characterized as ambitious in that 
all states are individually responsible for protecting their citi-
135 d . f al . h zens, a tra e agreement IS more o a contractu treaty Wit 
promises and exchanges between each of the member states. 
There are strong economic reasons to join these trade agreements 
beyond the altruism and moral leadership that motivates signature 
of human rights treaties. In addition, while private actors could 
bring a case against their own government if private actor partici-
'" On example is the U.N. CHARTER: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to es-
tablish conditions under which justice and respect for the ob-
ligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in large freedom ... and for these 
ends ... to employ international machinery for the promo-
tion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples 
See U.N. CHARTER, preamble. For another examples see the ICCPR, supra 
note 32, pt. II, art. 2 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction the ri!dtts recognized in the present Covenant."); Nigel Rodley, On 
the Necessity of ihe United States Ratification of the International Human Rights 
Conventions, in HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, WITH OR WITHOUT REsER-
VATIONS?, 3, 15 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 19852 ("I would be remiss if I did not 
reaffirm the principle of the inherent desirability of providing individuals who 
think they have been victimized by their governments with a forum for brin~a 
ing such alleged victimization to the attention. of an international body.") 
{regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination). 
135 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
13-14 (1993). 
• 
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pation were permitted in international trade agreements, that is 
hardly the sole purpose of allowing private actor participation. 
Arguably, private actor standing undermines the authority of 
the government to negotiate trade treaties.136 Professor Nichols 
argues that domestic groups opposing their governments would 
create a "spectacle. "137 First, this assumes, somewhat condescend-
ingly, that other states and trade bureaucracies could not distin-
guish between the government and private parties or interest 
groups if they took opposing sides in dispute resolution.138 Sec-
ond, this misses the point of a dispute resolution procedure. Dis-
pute resolution is designed to resolve disagreements after an 
agreement is signed. · The extension of standing in dispute resolu-
tion does not, for better or worse, give these private actors a voice 
as the trade agreement is being negotiated. 
In the end, the benefits accruing from international trade 
agreements will outweigh nations' reluctance to join organiza-
tions where their own citizens could have standing. For example, 
Turkey has had a traditional reluctance to reco~nize individual 
rights and standing under human rights treaties1 but has appar-
ently calculated that the economic benefit of joining the EU out-
weighs these concerns and so has applied for EU membership. 
A separate objection could be that individual participation is 
neither appropriate nor efficient given the particular goals of the 
international organization. The idea that certain organizations 
would not benefit from individual participation, is an important 
one in evaluating when and how private actors should be in-
volved. Clearly, a blanket statement that private actors will al-
ways improve an organization is naive. The distinction between 
"facilitative" and "producing" international organizations, made 
by Kenneth Abbott in outlining mesoinstitution theory, would 
136 See Philip M. Nichols, supra note 22, 316-18 (1996). 
137 See id. at 317. 
138 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by 
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 
359, 374 (1996). . 
139 . ' - . 
Turkey has not .signed the ICCPR or the Protocol to the European 
Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR ") providing for individual standing. See 
ICCPR, supra note 32; Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force, 
Oct. 1, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 140. 
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perhaps shed the most light.140 If the goal of the organization was 
"facilitative" -public awareness, convening negotiations, organiz-
ing meetings-then private actor involvement appears to be less 
compelling. As the goals of the organization becomes more 
"producing," i.e., adjudicating behavior, creating norms, setting 
negotiation agendas, and the organization is more centralized, the 
importance of private actors become more compelling. These 
producing organizations become lawmakers and the concerns of 
democracy and legitimacy must be recognized. Perhaps one of the 
reasons this debate over democracy and legitimacy has arisen in 
the first place is that more trade organizations are moving along 
the facilitative-producing continuum to become more important 
players in the creation of international law. 
4.5.2. Individual Participation is Logistically Unfeasible 
Another objection to individual participation is that the me-
chanics of such a srstem would overwhelm the structure of the 
trade organization.1 1 A corollary of this argument is the fear that 
·there will be numerous frivolous suits or that individual participa-
tion will be limited to the wealthy. 142 · 
While the logistics of involving·private actors are undoubtedly 
complex, this is hardly a reason not to· set up an organization 
properly. Certain standing requirements or a screening system, 
such as exists with the European and Inter-American human 
rights systems, 143 could be established.144 The issue of logistics is 
140 See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of For· 
mal Orsanizations in International Politics (unpublished manuscript on file with 
authors). 
141 Ambassador John McDonald notes that the bureaucracy and funding 
requirements of setting up such a system should not be underestrmated. See In· 
terview with John McDonald (Ambassador to International Labor Organiza-
tion) {March 17, 1998); see also Nichols, supra.note 22, at 312-13 (casting doubt 
on the practically of a system that would allow equitable, direct participation 
by all the world's citizens). 
142 See Nichols, supra note 22, at 318-19. 
143 See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 
· 673 {1970); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
1
" See ~lenT. Schleyer, Note, P01J!er to the People: Allowing Private Parties 
to RaiSe Cla1rm Before the WTO DISfJute Resolution System, 65 FORD. L. REV. 
2275 (proposing a Commission for Free Trade to screen disputes for the WTO); 
see also Shell, supra note 138, at 375 (noting that both tlie United States Su-
preme Court and the E. C.J. have establislied rules regulating standing that, 
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an issue of money and support for the organization. It is a ques-
tion of what the member states choose to support. The expansion 
of the WTO legal service in comparison to the previous service 
under GATT demonstrates what can be accomplished with the 
will of the governments. 
The concern about the availability of the necessary resources 
to pursue international remedies is a valid one. It is, however, the 
same concern that should exist in the current situation where pri-
vate actors need resources in order to lobby their governments. 
Arguably, leaving it to each private actor to evaluate his or her 
economic gains and losses from bringing a case provides for less 
distortion than filtering that choice through the national govern-
ment. 
4. 5.3. Trade is Politics 
A final objection to individual involvement could be that the 
premise behind separating trade and domestic politics is inher-
ently flawed. This argument maintains that ultimately politics 
and political interests should determine the enforcement of trade 
agreements. Individual injustice, if it occurs, is not really the fo-
cus of trade policy. Trade policy focuses on the good of the state 
as a whole and the government is in the best position to deter-
mine that interest. This objection goes back to the idea that di-
plomacy, secrecy, and negotiation are the best way to handle dis-
putes between sovereign states.145 The process of judicialization-
which individual involvement moves forward-is not appropriate 
for trade policy. 
This objection attacks the heart of how one thinks about the 
international syste!ll. If trade should be bound to politics, if states 
should be the focus of the international system, if diplomacy is 
the best way to resolve disputes, my proposal is yet another step 
on the slippery slope of giving more power to citizens and erod-
ing the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, if increased le-
galization and judicialization of international law make the inter-
national system more effective and more responsive, 146 then this 
while not perfect, are sufficient to satisfy participants in the system that deci-
sions are not political judgments). 
145 N'hl 1c o s, supra note 22, at 319. 
146 See Petersmann, supra note 95 (explaining the importance of increased 
judicialization in the GATT context). 
1998] DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 637 
proposal might hold some interest.147 It is really a question of 
one's views the continuing evolution of the international system. 
Increased legitimacy and democracy are appropriate goals under a 
view of liberal governance. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The article intended to demonstrate two things. My first goal 
was to turn the focus to dispute resolution as a way of dealing 
with some of the traditional critiques of international trade or-
ganizations. Increasing individual participation addresses the lib-
eral international relations goals of examining the role of private 
actors behind the state. Individual participation can also be used 
as a measure for democracy and legitimacy of trade organizations. 
Finally, I argue individual participation can help reduce the issue 
of capture. • 
My second goal was illustrating that as regional and interna-
tional organizations are created, states should examine carefully 
the type of dispute resolution mechanism they establish. 148 Inter-
national trade organizations diminish the returns of the treaty by 
limiting their dispute resolution mechanisms to states. By provid-
ing rights without a remedy, these international trade organiza-
tions are limiting both their impact and their legitimacy. The so-
lution is to reduce the link between domestic or short-term 
147 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Rer;olution, 17 
U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 33, 58 (1996) (arguing that judicial institutions make 
international trade agreements more binding ana more attractive); see also Steve 
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade 
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 331, 343-46 (1996) (arguinjl that in-
creased transparency of the WTO system is inevitable and al'propriate); G. 
Richard Shell, supra note 138, at 37 4 (arguing that issues which ptt governments 
against governments and governments !. nst. interest groups will not result in 
confusion on the position of each entity ; YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra 
note 21, at 86-106 (discussing how the evelopment of"minilateralism" or the 
creation of supranational institutions for small groups of countries leads to 
more effective trade liberalism). 
'" Some focus has already been given to the 'mpact of different dispute 
resolution mechanisms on emerging or~;anizations and I this will hopefully con-
tinue. See Taylor, supra note 70 (exarmning NAFTA and MERCOSUR); Gar-
cia, supra !'ote 11 (analyz~g t~e Free Trade Ar~ of the Americas ("FTAA") 
and applymg the mesomstttuttonal theory); Davtd Lopez, Dzspute kesolutton 
under a Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Shape of Things to Come, 28INTER-
AM. L. REv. 597 (1997) (discussing the alternatives for developing a dispute 
resolution mechanism under theFT AA). 
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political interests of states and their.trade policy by granting pri-
vate actors standing to bring cases for treaty violation. 
The arguable purpose of international trade treaties is broad 
encouragement of trade by requiring, at the outset, that member 
states do not take actions that would adversely affect individual 
players. The rights provided in these treaties and the benefits 
therefrom accrue most directly to private actors, and only to their 
governments indirectly through better economies, more tax in-
come, and reelection. The benefits of trade treaties are best pro-
tected and enforced by those most directly affected. 
To examine the EU, although it poses its own questions about 
the democracy deficit, is to observe an international organization 
committed to ensuring that the guidelines set forth in the Treaty 
of Rome are followed. The dispute resolution system in the EU 
guarantees more compliance by allowing private actors directly 
affected by each country's actions to bring cases in the nation:il 
courts {and in certain cases to the ECJ directly). 
This result allows for the use of private attorneys general to 
enforce the law based on their own assessment of the harm they 
are suffering and the cost of litigation devoid of political concerns. 
In the EU system, we do not rely on states, each of which may 
have an interest in allowing others to continue violating the treaty 
or may not want to bring a case against another state for political 
reasons. When we are left to rely on states to enforce the law un-
der a trade treaty we are left with an incomplete system. 
If states are actually committed to the trade treaties they sign 
and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents, 
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the 
dispute. resolution mechanism established under the treaty.; Fur-
thermore, these cases should not be decided under arbitration, as 
is the system under NAFTA for investor disputes. An ever-
changing arbitration panel creates neither a uniform body of law 
nor precedent and, in the end, can never carry the weight of an 
international standing body. 
As the number of regional and international trade agreements 
grows, their dispute resolution mechanisms will only increase in 
importance. In order to ensure real change in the trade laws and 
real compliance by the constituent states; we must provide for in-
dividual standing. Rights without a remedy are hollow rights. 
